seejps

Coordinated by Sabin DRĂGULIN

Perceptions on the Political System and the Constitution Reform

 

Cristian ANDREI

Romanian Political Marketing Association (ARMP)

Political Rating Agency (ARP)

 

 

Abstract: Constitutional reform, issue ballots or policy making in general are the same as and maybe more than elections the subject of interactions between providers of public products, ideas and services, and the public which is the final “consumer”. The “making” or the revision of the Constitution is a long process where both sides of this exchange influence each other and to some extent they acknowledge the opinion of the other. By studying public opinion and reactions to initiatives by politicians in Romania regarding Constitutional change this paper explains what the output of this “conversation” in recent years is. Results of surveys relative to issues and results in previous referendums are also presented. Additionally a discussion is made about the elections results, the electoral system and the party system perceptions. This statistical and numerical report is moreover expected to provide from a political marketing perspective an insight on what kind of strategic posture political parties choose in this process.

 

Keywords: Constitutional change, political marketing, political system, referendums, public opinion.

 

1. INTRODUCTION

A constitutional reform is about social and political change. It is about what a society or group of people envision now for the future. It’s what people think now about what it would would subsequently be good. The motivations are forged from experiences and the general past and present contexts. Essentially it is what people perceive as correct or productive to the present political and social system, how they evaluate the output of general rules.

Even if a new Constitutional draft is written by a group of experts and politicians their work is done within a framework of trust and support from the general public, an agenda pushed by the mass-media, politicians and organised interested groups. The Constitutional debate follows these general lines and eventually the public opinion is set to a certain degree of interest and to some important issues.

The focus here is to underline key public opinion responses to long-lasting issues in the Romanian public debate regarding regime change or annotations, re-evaluations of public interest and public life, and what is sometimes called “the efficiency” of the political system. The opinion-context in which the new draft is prepared plays a major role in understanding what support some new features will have and what public trends politicians will follow or try to determine.

From a political marketing perspective, influenced by marketing management theory, there are two strategic general postures: political parties leading or following (public opinion, consumers), and mixed postures of these two[1]. This is useful here also for understanding that a Constitutional reform is an exchange process between an audience which is also subject to debate, on the one hand, and the people who are actually writing the text, on the other hand. They influence each other, but how strong and productive this exchange is it’s probably a matter of political culture on both sides.[2]

It is also helpful for clarifying that during the exchange the output is volatile, even if for example a leading strategic posture which can be identified in classic political science to a strong ideological-doctrine party will push more on its own arguments than listen to what the public has to say. In the end, it is the role of political parties and interest groups to choose and come up with a filtered vision and version of the general public agenda. Yet, such a representative bares in mind up to the end the final sanctioning vote usually done in a Referendum, and works under this specific pressure of public support.

In addition, the Constitution is not only an isolated item living in a vacuum. Its provisions become political issues per-se in a power-seeking game by political parties and candidates. Public opinion follows and influences over again this power struggle.

The present paper is close to a statistical and sociological evaluation of some important issues in the Constitutional debate and of data regarding participation and interest in similar previous moments (1991, 2003). Moreover, it covers some findings and facts regarding the output of the electoral system as a premise and information for the debates related to the political system architecture.

The data is collected from national opinion polls conducted in 2013[3] during the very months and days before the Parliamentary committee drafted the project, as well as from some earlier surveys, conducted in 2011. I will also employ generic data from similar available surveys. For participation I look at official Referendum reports of the past (1991, 2003, 2007, 2009, and 2012) and to the specific political context. Actual elections results will help draw a picture of how the Romanian political landscape looks like after 22 years under a democratic Constitution and how an extra element, the electoral system, can reshape the perceptions regarding the Constitution.

 

2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

A new Constitution was drafted and validated in Romania in 1991. In a way it was merely a confirmation of the new political system structure which emerged from the violent and only to some point negotiated transformations of 1989 and early 1990. The text described actually the new political reality as it was de-facto created by the new leaders. The check and balances were a result of their day by day power game. Beside the “revolutionary” legitimacy the power-holders (FSN) worked the draft under the large majority and enthusiastic mandate received in the first free elections of May 1990. This initial support was built in an extraordinary and special context. It had no previous democratic and constitutional experience, possessing only the ideological and totalitarian ritual practices before 1989. The sole benchmark was that of Western democracies, consequently the concepts and the language were adapted to make the new Romanian law compatible.

Since in 1990 the new text was so umbilically connected to the powerful party FSN and its amalgamated vision on the political system all the subsequent debates pointed to this biased construction. Even if presidents, Prime Ministers and parties in power eventually changed during the 23 years of democracy, the issue of the primordial flaws in the system returned over and over to the public agenda. Politicians from all sides blamed the Constitutional provisions at some point for the shortcomings of everyday politics and used them to engage in political accusations.

The support for the 2003 revision of the fundamental law was raised in connection with the objective of EU accession and integration. It was again an extraordinary motivation, namely to make an EU compatible version. Due to the political context no essential change was made as to the structure of power or as to the type of Republic, the only essential modifications being that the President’s tenure was extended from 4 to 5 years and the latter’s power to recall the prime-minister was limited.

Political fights and tremendous scandals, accusations of authoritarianism against the President and criticism for the Parliament’s lack of functionality, heavy political cases at the Constitutional Court regarding the balance of power or even concerning day-to-day responsibilities of democratic institutions, all have flourished in recent years. The Constitution revision has become a very partisan electoral issue and an instrument of attacking political opponents.

 

  3. THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS

 Until 1947 and the advent of the totalitarian regime, Romania as a modern state was a constitutional monarchy. The rapid option for a continuation of the Republic after 1989 had created a long living issue regarding the necessity and rightness of restoring the monarchy. Later, new arguments about failed and corrupt politics have also pleaded for this alternative. They positioned monarchy as an objective and patriotic reality, above small and frivol party interests. The support has never been large in opinion polls; however, a minority always kept this battle alive. At the same time the economic and social disappointments under the new regime imbued another minority with the need to undo democracy and return to dictatorship or to another form of (indefinite) authoritarian rule. Table 1 shows the limits of these orientations and the predominant option for the republic, registered in April 2013. 

 

Table 1: In your opinion Romania should be:

 

A democratic Republic

64.2%

A constitutional and democratic monarchy

20.5%

A dictatorship

5.9%

Don’t know

9.4%

   

Table 2 (April 2013) indicates small variations in these options when asking a similar question but much more oriented to the resident of the power.  

 

Table 2: Who would better lead Romania?

 

A President directly elected by the people

62.6%

A queen or a king who inherits the throne and acts in constitutional boundaries

16.8%

A dictator

8%

A Prime Minister nominated by the winning party in elections

5%

Don’t know

7.6%

 

 The same rapid reconstruction of the regime after 1989 put at the head of the state an elected President with executive powers. At that time the option was presented as opening the possibility for all people to change the head of state by universal vote, which was a popular idea and in opposition to the practices inherited from the communist regime. Unclear responsibilities for this position and later large political scandals between the President and the Prime Minister or the President and the Parliament triggered some political parties to discuss other options such as: the President elected by the Parliament or the Prime Minister acting as the head of state. The counter response to this was the accusation that political parties want to block the Romanians’ direct vote and to increase their power against the people. The public opinion seems definite in this matter refusing the alternatives to the current situation (Table 3, April 2013). One can say that the legacy of the first years after the Revolution is still alive and powerful.

 

Table 3: Who should elect the President?

 

People directly by universal vote

88.2%

The Parliament

8.9%

Don’t know

2.9%

 

For the same purpose of defining the role of the Presidency some have argued that a President should only play a decorative part in the Republic, while others are claiming that a better idea would be to have a full-responsible President acting as the leader and manager of the executive branch. Firstly, Table 4 (April 2013) is pointing to an equilibrium of opinions. No option has a majority, only the “more power” alternative is in some disadvantage. 

 

Table 4: The President of Romania, after the Constitution revision, should have:

 

Less power than now

33.6%

The same power as now

32.7%

More power than now

25.0%

Don’t know

8.7%

 

Secondly, the suggestion to merge the President’s and the Prime Minister’s offices in order to have a clear leader of the executive branch, which is the equivalent of expanding either the President’s role, or that of the Prime Minister, has a low backing (Table 5, April 2013). This may seem strange for an observer of the Romanian politics, as long as the main frictions and political fights are connected to the blurred distinctions between the two offices. However, a powerful and in total control President is too much to bear for a sensitive society which has both the tragic past of dictatorship and a growing disappointment towards politicians. 

 

Table 5: What option is preferable for Romania?

 

The President to represent the state, and separately the Prime Minister to lead the Government, the same as it’s now

72.8%

The President to be the head of state and at the same time to lead the Government

22.0%

Don’t know

5.1%

 

The increasingly political strife and the difference in the tenure of the President, on the one hand, and of the Parliament and cabinet mandate, on the other hand (5, respectively 4 years) that led to a cohabitation stance between opposing forces since 2004 are not strong enough incentives for the people to ask for a diminishment or annulment of the President’s or the Prime Minister’s office. On the contrary, people are oriented towards cooperation.

In December 2012 after the Parliamentary elections and after a political crisis that had led to suspicions expressed by the EU’s and the US’s officials regarding democracy in Romania, a “cohabitation and institutional cooperation agreement” was signed between the Prime Minister and the President[4]. A majority of Romanians have a positive perception of such a mutual understanding (Table 6, April 2013). One may say that what they ask from politicians is precisely to cooperate in the framework of the present Constitution, and are not ready to validate a change in the structure of powers. 

 

Table 6: Do you appreciate the cohabitation agreement between Prime Minister Ponta and President Băsescu …?

 

Is good for Romania

45.8%

Is not good for Romania

32.5%

Has neither a positive nor a negative impact

13.6%

Don’t know

8.1%

 

4. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The electoral system is a key factor in the Constitutional arrangement, even if it’s not an effective component of the fundamental act. The allocation method for number of votes into number of seats in the Parliament substantially alters the perception on the political system as a whole. In line with Duverger[5] or Taagepera and Shugart[6] one will find that depending on the electoral algorithm the output of elections varies significantly and there are totally different paths of democratic evolutions.

Following Duverger’s classic “laws”, or later “hypothesis”, proportionality will encourage a multi-party system and coalition governments, and a majority rule will encourage a two or two and a half party system. The Constitution provides that a separate law is responsible for how elections are organised. However, the mechanical effects described by Duverger are of great importance when designing the power structure and functions. A system oriented toward a larger political representation is expected to choose a proportional formula and a more important role for the Parliament. Vice versa, a system oriented toward effective Government will tend to fortify the executive branch.

Romania picked some of both. The predominant electoral rule in local, parliamentary and European elections is based on proportionality; even if in 2008 a new mixed formula was put in place, the prevalent effects are proportional[7]. Predominantly electoral alliances and coalition governments were formed in the central Government and in the local councils. The number of effective parties calculated by the Taagepera and Shugart formula had an average value close to 4[8] (Table 7) which is a clear indication of multi-party system. Political parties are aware of the consequences of the system and they are trying periodically to grab more power by attempting to change the electoral formula to their advantage. When they are up in the polls and leading the market they tend to favour the majoritarian rule; and contrariwise, when they go down in the polls and have a weaker position, they tend to prefer a proportional rule[9]

 

Table 7: Elections, winners, coalitions, effective number of parties

 

Winner

Winner’s Votes %

No. of Parties in Parliament

Effective No. of parties

 

Government

1990

FSN

67.52

16

NA

1 party

1992

FDSN

28.29

8

4.5

1 party + support from 4 parties in Parliament

1996

CDR

30.70

8

3.9

4 parties + other civic organisations

2000

PDSR

37.09

5

3.2

1 party + support from 1 party in Parliament

2004

PSD

37.16

6

4.9

4 parties and later 3 parties

2008

PDL

33.57

5

3.5

2 parties and later 3 parties

2012

USL (3 parties)

60.10

6

3.8

3 parties

 

 Nevertheless the executive branch has many constitutional reinforcements and a double “command”: the Prime minister who depends on the vote of the Parliament, but has the necessary instruments to lead the legislative activity; and the President who is elected directly by the people and can be sacked only by referendum, even if he is impeached by a majority of the MPs; the President leads mostly uncensored the foreign policy and has important responsibilities regarding the judicial system and the secret services. As noted above the relation between the two offices is also problematic and has generated permanent conflicts[10].

This confusing duality of proportionality-coalitions system, on the one hand, and semi-presidential stance of the democratic regime[11], on the other hand, has not generated a rich mutual cooperation, but the opposite. Although the power is mostly in the hands of the executive branch, there is dissatisfaction with the Parliament which was most of the time unable to provide a clear Government formula, causing permanent coalition scandals, renegotiations and setbacks.

The results were clear in the case of a successful 2009 referendum organised by the President and its loyal coalition. Even in this case it was obvious that politicians were trying to rearrange the political system to accommodate more power to their camp – in this particular case, the President[12]. It was an easy choice to organise an issue ballot as long as the Parliament and the political parties have had in all the opinion polls of the previous years a favourability index around or below 10%. Some may call it a populist move or a strong “following” strategic posture[13].

Table 8 and 9 show how the Romanians responded in this “constitutional reform” referendum[14]. The first question regarded the number of chambers in the Parliament – there are two since 1990[15] with similar responsibilities, and only slightly different after the 2003 revision. The second was about the maximum number of MPs – usually around 470 – and the general idea that MPs are useless in such a great number and they only spend and squander money pointlessly. That is why the second question had even a greater success. 

 

Table 8: Referendum question No 1: Do you agree to Romania’s adoption of a unicameral Parliament?

 

 

Shares

Votes

Yes

77.7%

6740213

No

22.2%

1925209

 

Table 9: Referendum question No 2: Do you agree to the reduction of the number of parliamentarians to a maximum of 300 persons?

 

 

Shares

Votes

Yes

88.4%

7765573

No

22.2%

975252

 

The debate around the Parliament’s utility and efficiency pointed again to another radical option supported by a minority. The economic, social and political discontent prompted the idea that political parties are useless and they are not necessary or that one party is enough (similar to the Communist experience). The results of a survey in 2011 (December) are showing that a multi-party system is supported only by a 30% minority, and that a one-party system is attractive for almost 20% (Table 10), especially young people (Table 11). 

 

Table 10: What party system do you prefer for Romania?

 

No parties

1.2%

Only one party

19.5%

A system with two parties which alternate in power depending on elections

42.6%

A system with more than three parties which form coalitions in government or in opposition

29.9%

Don’t know

8.1%

 

Table 11: Crosstab party system vs. age

 

 

Total

18-29 years

30-44 years

45-59 years

Over
60 years

No parties

1.3%

0%

2.5%

1.0%

1.2%

Only one party

19.5%

32.7%

19.8%

163%

17.9%

A system with two parties which alternate in power depending on elections

42.5%

37.%

42.6%

42.4%

43.8%

A system with more than three parties which form coalitions in government or in opposition

29.8%

23.0%

27.7%

36.5%

28.0%

Don’t know

5.7%

5.3%

5.9%

3.5%

7.8%

 

In spite of the technical and mathematical elaboration of the electoral formula and its effects, the Romanians have revealed a large support for the majoritarian electoral system and the two-party system. In a broader understanding it can be seen both as an adaptation to the constitutional framework and as a request for more electoral and constitutional reform. This support was somewhat visible in a 2007 referendum regarding the electoral reform[16], although the turnout was low (about 26%) – see Table 12.

 

Table 12: Referendum question: Do you agree that, beginning with the next elections that will be held for the Romanian Parliament, all deputies and senators be elected in single-member constituencies, based on a majority vote in two rounds?

 

 

Shares

Votes

Yes

16.17%

784640

No

81.36%

3947212

 

 Pushing further the populist-following posture some parties suggested to the public that “too many elections” are not necessary and that it would be useful to merge the dates of some elections, local, parliamentary or presidential[17]. It was again an opportunistic approach taken by some of the parties favoured by such a move in the political context. Table 13, December 2011, shows the lack of support for this idea, although there was a great polarisation between the parties in power (PDL) and opposition (USL, PPDD) at that moment (Table 14, December 2011). Later on, the Constitutional Court repealed the decision to merge local and parliamentary elections on “system predictability” grounds (the elections were too close to change the dates). 

 

Table 13: What do you prefer?

 

Elections should be organised on separate days, the local elections in June, and the parliamentary in November, as it was before?

56.2%

Local and parliamentary elections should be organised the same day in 2012, merged?

36.1%

Don’t know

7.8%

 

Table 14: Crosstab support for elections dates merger vs. political vote

 

 

Total

PDL

USL

PPDD

Undecided

Elections should be organised on separate days, the local elections in June, and the parliamentary ones in November, as it was before?

56.2%

25.2%

71.8%

66.9%

49.0%

Local and parliamentary elections should be organized the same day in 2012, merged?

36.1%

72.9%

21.8%

27.3%

38.5%

 

Additionally one proposal from 2013 and adopted in the official report of the official Constitutional committee[18] is to permanently separate the parliamentary and presidential elections, by reducing again the presidential to 4 years and by interpolating the two types of elections. Table 15 shows the positive response to this idea in the results of a survey conducted at the beginning of June 2013, the same time the revisions were drafted. Likewise, Table 16 from the same survey indicates a clear support for reducing back the Presidential mandate to 4 years. 

 

Table 15: Presidential and parliamentary elections should be permanently separated?

 

I am more likely to support

64.7%

I am more likely to be against

27.8%

Don’t know

6.7%

 

Table 16: The presidential term should again be of 4 years, not 5 as it is now?

 

I am more likely to support

82.3%

I am more likely to be against

10.9%

Don’t know

7.5%

 

A wider range of proposals to increase the Parliament strength and role has been put into question. This comes as a response to years of public discourse against the institution and the manufactured idea that Romanians “hate” or don’t want a Parliament. All these propositions are rated positively and with high rates of approval (Tables 17, 18 and 19, in June 2013). This proves again that the extreme following or leading postures in a constitutional democratic debate can be misleading and toxic. The question in Table 17 settles a political debate in recent years, when some accused that such an initiative would be an abuse from the Parliament against other independent branches of the Government. The results in Table 19 bring the answer to a discussion about limiting the President’s intervention over the decision of the Parliament or the Prime Minister. It has a limited but 50% majority support and it’s an addition to another limitation in the 2003 revision that restricted the President in revoking the Prime Minister and in extending his powers by large re-interpretations of the Constitution.

 

Table 17: Any citizen, judge, minister or businessman should be bound to present himself in front of a control Parliamentary committee?

 

I am more likely to support

 78.5%

I am more likely to be against

 15.1%

Don’t know

 6.4%

 

Table 18: At least once in a month the Prime Minister should be compelled to go and talk in front of the Parliament?

 

I am more likely to support

 90.3%

I am more likely to be against

5.5%

Don’t know

4.2% 

 

Table 19: The president should not be allowed to cancel a minister’s appointment?

 

I am more likely to support

 52.5%

I am more likely to be against

 37.7%

Don’t know

 9.7%

 

 The support for an efficient Parliament and Government and for stopping political crisis is displayed in the results of a question presented in Table 20 (June 2013). It is a change proposal responding to situations like the one of 2009 when a new majority dismissed the Cabinet, indicated the new prime minister, but the President refused to appoint him. For a three month period the former Cabinet provisionally ran the country with limited powers and organised presidential elections and a referendum, until the re-elected President managed to force another majority in Parliament.

 

Table 20: The opposition in the Parliament may revoke a Cabinet only if they propose at the same time the name of the next prime minister?

 

I am more likely to support

50,1%

I am more likely to be against

33,4%

Don’t know

16,5%

 

 A large controversy in Romania’s post 1989 politics refers to the phenomenon of elected officials changing their party membership for personal, political or other opportunistic reasons. A law of 2004 ruled that local elected officials will lose their office if they quit the party that supported them in elections. Many say now that a similar stipulation should limit the MPs’ transfers. An interesting case happened in 2009-2012 when a group of MPs from all opposition parties created a new political group in the Parliament and a new political party that ensured the critical 50% majority for the ruling party (PDL). Accusations of blackmailing MPs and opportunistic behaviour were made. A proposal was advanced in 2013 to sanction the “migrating” MPs from a party to another through a local referendum. Even the constitutional committee rejected up to this point any amendment on this matter it enjoys a strong public support (see Table 21, June 2013). 

 

Table 21: Can MPs changing the party that supported them in the elections be revoked by a local referendum?

 

I am more likely to support

80.6%

I am more likely to be against

12.3%

Don’t know

7%

    

         5. THE INTEREST FOR THE CONSTITUTION REVISION

The history of the electorate’s participation in elections and referendums after 1989 is one that went from enthusiasm to indifference. Referendums have followed the general trend, the participation in both 1991 and 2003 constitutional referendums, and even in the more political referendums of 2007 and 2009 with a constitutional agenda, being very similar to the closest elections in time. The data and trends are shown in Table 22. By analysing this simple data set it becomes obvious that the interest in referendums is correlated with the overall interest in elections and politics. 

 

Table 22: History of participation in elections and referendums

 

Elections

Date

Participation

Share

Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

May 1990

14826616

86.2%

Constitution referendum

December 1991

10948468

67.3%

Local elections

February 1992

10812023

65.0%

Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

September 1992

12496430

76.29%

Presidential elections, 2nd round

October 1992

12153810

73.23%

Local elections

June 1996

10016932

56.47%

Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

November 1996

13088388

76.01%

Presidential elections, 2nd round

November 1996

13078883

75.9%

Local elections

June 2000

9295165

50.85

Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

November 2000

11559458

65.3%

Presidential elections, 2nd round

December 2000

10184715

57.5%

Constitution revision referendum

October 2003

9938441

55.7%

Local elections

June 2004

9911813

54.22%

Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, 1st round

November 2004

10794653

58.51%

Presidential elections, 2nd round

December 2004

10112262

55.21%

Impeachment referendum against the President

May 2007

8135272

44.45%

European elections

October 2007

5370171

29.46%

Referendum for “electoral reform”

October 2007

4851470

26.51%

Local elections

June 2008

9045068

48.81%

Parliamentary elections

November 2008

7238871

39.2%

European elections

June 2009

5035299

27.67%

Referendum for “Parliament reform”

November 2009

9320240

50.95%

Presidential elections, 1st round

November 2009

9946748

54.4%

Presidential elections, 2nd round

December 2009

10620116

58.02%

Local elections

June 2012

10430884

56.3%

Impeachment referendum against the President

July 2012

8459053

46.24%

Parliamentary elections

December 2012

7666169

41.7%

 

 This seems to be the case also in 2013. The survey of April 2013 revealed a participation interest in the Constitutional Referendum of 45.2%[19] as compared to 50.3% interest in Presidential elections (forthcoming in 2014). Withal, this number is close to the 41.7% participation in Parliamentary elections held last December. This represents a problem for a potential referendum for the Constitution draft if the threshold will still be of 50%, given that a highly disputed revision of the law of referendum has recently (May 2013) lowered the threshold to 30%. It still waits for a positive sanction from the Constitutional Court.       

Previous referendums for validating or amending the Constitution in 1991 and 2003 indicated a strong support for the act (Table 23 and 24), but again it was related to the interest in politics and context at that time[20].  

 

Table 23: The response in the Constitution referendum of 1991

 

 

Votes

Shares

Yes

8464624

79.1%

No

2235085

20.9%

 

Table 24: The response in the Constitution referendum of 2003

 

 

Votes

Shares

Yes

8915022

91.06%

No

875172

8.93%

  

 6. CONCLUSIONS

 The Romanians tend to support a Constitution reform which renders the political process more effective, but are reluctant to back an unbalanced strengthening of one specific branch of the government. They want an efficient Government, but it should also be accountable to the Parliament. They want the President to be the leader of the State, yet with balanced and limited tasks. The political scandals and crisis should not be a pretext for offering someone more power or for reducing the other’s, but an incentive for cooperation between power holders.

In recent years, the Constitution has become a political battleground. The strategic postures of the combatants are more likely to suggest an interest in extending self-power than a market “exchange” approach towards the public. In spite of heavy argumentation a lot of the politicians’ “suppositions” about what “do the Romanians really think” of their political system have proven to be false. Even when some leaders are “following” the public mind on certain issues, there is always another side of the same story in the collective opinion which tends to balance the narrow proposition made by politicians. The excessive interpretations of what “do people want” are transformed into a manufactured reality repudiated by the public.

Yet, the interest in constitutional matters has depended on the political context. This is an indication that public opinion is reacting strongly to the political system output and that the Constitution is a substantial part of the respective system.

The electoral system has a great impact on how the political system is evaluated by people and on the support of the Constitutional structure of powers. For instance, a proportional formula is likely to lead to unsatisfactory negotiated results and tensions within coalitions which are not fully compatible with a strong definition of the executive branch.

If it wants to generate interest and participation, the process of “constitutional making” has to take into consideration both leading and following strategies in constructing the text and to share and integrate public opinion and sentiment. The modern political market orientation (PMO)[21] may be a solution to this issue.

 Appendix – Technical sheet

 The surveys of December 2011, April and June 2013 that were used in this study are all statistically representative for the population living on the territory of Romania. They were conducted by telephone interviews using CATI procedures and an approximation of Random Digit Dialling[22] technique for households’ telephones in Romania. At any rate, it was a private and independent endeavour pertaining to the Political Rating Agency, a periodical evaluation of the Romanian political arena (“Piaţa politică”, trans. “The Political Market”).

-   The 2011 survey: 8-16 December 2011, 960 interviews, +/-2.65% error.

-   The April 2013 survey: 12-17 April 2013, 1020 interviews +/-2.55% error.

-   The June 2013 survey: May 29 – June 6 2013, 1090 interviews, +/-2.5% error.

All the participation and referendum or elections results data were collected from official sources, with the exception of 1990-1992 where access to archives was difficult and the numbers were picked from other public sources.

 

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DUVERGER, Maurice, Les partis politiques, 2nd ed., Armand Colin, Paris, 1976.

HENNEBERG, Stephan C., “Leading or Following? A Theoretical Analysis of Political Marketing Postures”, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 29-47.

O’SHAUGHNESY, Nicholas, Paul R. BAINES, Aron O’CASS, Robert P. ORMROD, “Political Marketing Orientation: Confusions, Complications, and Criticisms”, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2012, pp. 353-366S.

TAAGEPERA, Rein, Matthew SHUGART, Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989.

WRING, Dominic, “Political Marketing and Party Development in Britain: A ‘Secret’ History”, European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 30, No. 10/11, 1996, pp. 92-103.

 

 

 

 



[1] Stephan C. HENNEBERG, “Leading or Following? A Theoretical Analysis of Political Marketing Postures”, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 29-47.

[2] Cristian ANDREI, “Romania’s Total War. How Political Marketing Strategies Work in a Democratisation Process”, review process for Journal of Political Marketing, 2013; presented first at the conference „Political Spaces in Eurasia: Global Contexts, Local Outcomes”, Ralph and Ruth Fisher Forum at the University of Illinois in June 2012.

[3] At the Political Rating Agency (ARP or “Agenţia de Rating Politic”).

[4] It was more an agreement on a common interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.

[5] Maurice DUVERGER, Les partis politiques, 2nd ed., Armand Colin, Paris, 1976.

[6] Rein TAAGEPERA, Matthew SHUGART, Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989.

[7] Cristian ANDREI, “Despre efectele sistemului electoral românesc, cu ajutorul unei simulări electorale”, Expert electoral, No. 2, 2013.

[8] N (where p= party share of votes/seats, n=number of parties). This index shows the concentration of power in elections or in Parliament, by trying to operationalize the concept of “relevant party”.

[9] Cristian ANDREI, „Romania’s Total War… cit”.

[10] Not necessarily during previous years when unstable coalitions ruled and in cohabitation with the President, but also in 1990-1991 or later in 2001-2004, when FSN and its successor PDSR got strong majorities. The 1991 conflict had even bloody consequences when mass protesters and workers rallied against the Prime Minister and turned into violent actions.

[11] As it is called by constitutional experts.

[12] The referendum had a very clear electoral purpose. It overlapped with the presidential elections where the incumbent Băsescu successful portrayed his opposition as the “failed” politics represented by the Parliament’s activity.

[13] Stephan C. HENNEBERG, “Leading or Following? … cit”.

[14] The results are not mandatory for the Parliament, even the Constitutional Court explained in repealing a new electoral reform in 2012 that the law does not take into account the „will” of the Romanians validated in the 2009 Referendum.

[15] Before the 1991 Constitution was validated, a Decree (No. 92, March 14 1990) issued by the National Unity Provisional Council – in fact a provisional revolutionary Parliament – instated the separation of powers principle, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the proportional formula and the President of the Republic. It was the ground for organising the first elections in May 20, 1990.

[16] This referendum was organised in the same manner as an electoral campaign issue for the party sympathetic to the President, in the first elections for the European Parliament, and as an attack against the party-system.

[17] From 1992 to 2004 local elections were held approximately 6 months before the parliamentary and presidential elections (the same day). Since 2008 due to the expansion of the presidential mandate to 5 years, parliamentary and presidential elections are held separately, in an interval of 20 years when they coincide again.

[18] The Constitutional committee started its activity in May 2013 and continues further as this paper is being completed.

[19] A special note about Romanian surveys is that they are conducted on the population still living on Romania’s territory and are statistically representative for this population only. Another estimated 3 million Romanians are living abroad, and they are not accounted for in the polls, but they are accounted in the official voters’ lists. Romanians living abroad register a very low rate of participation. That is why the participation numbers in surveys must be calculated only from the total population still living within Romania’s borders, which results in a lower figure.

[20] In 2003 a large mobilisation made by political parties, and a special provision that a Referendum can be organised uninterruptedly over two days of the week (Saturday and Sunday) rendered possible such a participation.

[21] Dominic WRING, “Political Marketing and Party Development in Britain: A ‘Secret’ History”, European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 30, No. 10/11, 1996, pp. 92-103; Nicholas O’SHAUGHNESY, Paul R. BAINES, Aron O’CASS, and Robert P. ORMROD, “Political Marketing Orientation: Confusions, Complications, and Criticisms”, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2012, pp. 353-366.

[22] Michael C. CUMMINGS, „Radnom Digit Dialing: A Sampling Technique for Telephone Surveys”, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1979, pp. 233-244.

Bibliography

 

ANDREI, Cristian, “Despre efectele sistemului electoral românesc, cu ajutorul unei simulări electorale”, Expert electoral, No. 2, 2013.

ANDREI, Cristian, “Romania’s Total War. How Political Marketing Strategies Work in a Democratisation Process”, review process for Journal of Political Marketing, 2013.

CUMMINGS, Michael C., “Random Digit Dialling: A Sampling Technique for Telephone Surveys”, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1979, pp. 233-244.

DUVERGER, Maurice, Les partis politiques, 2nd ed., Armand Colin, Paris, 1976.

HENNEBERG, Stephan C., “Leading or Following? A Theoretical Analysis of Political Marketing Postures”, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 29-47.

O’SHAUGHNESY, Nicholas, Paul R. BAINES, Aron O’CASS, Robert P. ORMROD, “Political Marketing Orientation: Confusions, Complications, and Criticisms”, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2012, pp. 353-366S.

TAAGEPERA, Rein, Matthew SHUGART, Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989.

WRING, Dominic, “Political Marketing and Party Development in Britain: A ‘Secret’ History”, European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 30, No. 10/11, 1996, pp. 92-103.