Coordinated by Filip STANCIU


Political Elites, Knowledge and National Power in WWII United States



University of Bucharest & Université Montesquieu Bordeaux 4



Abstract:  The main idea of this paper is exploring the link between political elites, knowledge and national power. Namely, the article addresses the direct and quantifiable impact of knowledge upon national power that went alongside with knowledge’s creation and endorsement by US political establishment during WWII.

Keywords: knowledge, power, national power, post-industrial society, political and scientific elite.




The main focus of this paper is exploring the link between political elites, knowledge and national power. Trying to be in line with the proposed theme of the journal “Exercise of Power 500 years after the Publication of Prince”, in this brief article I shall try to present an outstanding episode relating to the knowledge/power dichotomy. In my view, its implications are still insufficiently researched by social scientists. I would like to point out the direct and quantifiable impact of knowledge upon national power that went alongside with the creation of knowledge and its endorsement by the US political establishment during WWII. Some may contend the selection of WWII United States as sample of the increase of national power due to knowledge being promoted by the political elite. It may be argued that my choice for a limit-case example: outstanding times, like WWII, may be inconsistent with making inferences such as knowledge influences national power.  Such a particular case might be considered an exception, rather than following the rule. Nonetheless, I would argue to the contrary. Extreme circumstances, like wars in this case, may prove sometimes to be better test grounds for ideas, due to their peculiarity. The actors involved are forced to make use of all their resources and put all their cards on the table, hence offer the researcher with the possibility of a more through insight.

I developed the argumentation below from the concept of a Post-Industrial society centered on the notion of knowledge. The view associated with the Post-Industrial society entails that a science-based “knowledge revolution” undergoes globally. Such ideas were forged by thinkers like Alvin Toffler in “The 3rd Wave”[1] or Daniel Bell in “The coming of the Post Industrial Society”[2].  In a post-industrial setting, the central role in economy and society is played by theoretical knowledge, technology, research and development as opposed to physical capital. Consequently, the predominance is not of factories, but of institutions like universities, think tanks, media, etc. created for the sake of creation and dissemination of information. Other traits of Post Industrial society derive from knowledge centrality: the prevalence of the white collar workers over blue-collars; increased levels of education for the bulk of population; predominance of the service sector over the agricultural and production, etc.

All theorists of Post-Industrial society place the beginning of this development stage after WWII and find its first manifestations in the American society. In this article, I examine the US just before Post-Industrialism, the traceable “moment” when knowledge was institutionally brought to the forefront by the political elite. This was the WWII period, when a growing awareness took root that the country’s military capability owes substantially to nation’s strength in science and engineering. In a nutshell, I am planning to argue that US’ national power has been decisively upgraded between 1939 and 1945 by the political elite’s decision to fully support the research and development (R&D) process. This took place with the creation of a specially designed institution whose purpose was of supporting and stimulating the knowledge process - the Office for Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). The OSRD was led by a key scientist, at the same time member of the political elite himself: Vannevar Bush. The institution is considered the base for what was from then onwards referred to as “engineers of the American century”[3], expressing the role US played on the world scene in the 20th century. Nonetheless, my period of reference is 1939-1945, when I shall point out the influence OSRD had in winning the WWII by the US and its allies due to the number of new inventions (the proximity fuse, radar, amphibian vehicle, A-bomb etc). Most of them have been in use since, with limited improvements in some cases.

The main research questions I raise are: what is the relation between political elites and knowledge in the American society during WWII?  Then, what is the dependency between knowledge and national power? It is my belief that there is a direct dependency relation between political elites, knowledge and national power: political elite’s à knowledge à national power. The political elite may encourage the alphabetization of society, funding new research, support certain educational projects, etc. to sum up, to support knowledge.  In direct correlation, there are elements of national power, at least the ones that are not perennial[4], that can be impacted by the knowledge factor; hence political elite’s decision to support knowledge with proper policies boosts national power. Consequently, the hypothesis I test in my paper is: US political elites’ decision to directly support knowledge during WWII, indirectly boosted American national power during the war.

My approach is structuralist through my analysis of the relations between structures and because the methodology I use is historical analysis. The paper has a threefold structure: I will first explain the main concepts, background and general structure on which I am planning to build my previously mentioned hypothesis. I will then fit the selected case study, on the previously constructed frame to verify the hypothesis. In this respect, I will bring forward the main social actors that took part in the process and the process itself. The final part is reserved for conclusions.



A simple definition of power may depict it as the ability to effect outcomes one wants and, if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make it happen[5].

Raymond Boudon and Francois Bourricaud argue that three notions of power must be made explicit if the term is to be usefully employed as a concept of analysis. First, power refers to “allocation of resources, of whatever nature these might be”[6]. Second, it describes the “craft to use resources,” entailing “a plan of use” and some “minimal information about the conditions and consequences of this use”[7]. Last notion refers to the “strategic character”, viewed in action and the “results of the action”. This threefold approach towards power can be described using a taxonomy that describes power as “resources”, “strategies” and “outcomes.”

Power understood as resources essentially describes the sum of capabilities available to any entity for influencing others. Traditionally these capabilities have been treated in relation to quantity, at least as far as international politics are concerned; thus, some have used measures such as natural resources, population, size of armed forces or the gross domestic product of countries etc. to rank the power of nations[8]. The advantage of this approach is that it allows one to rank diverse entities, be they individuals or states by using quantifiable measures. The problem is, however, it is not always clear what are the appropriate resources to be taken as estimates of real power, or if these, even possessed, are actually used in a given instance by the actor in question[9].

Rather than focusing on capabilities in any tangible or intangible sense, the second approach to power – understood as strategies – attempts to capture the processes, relationships, and situations through which entities intend to influence one another. The accent shifts to “context”[10]. This focus on context derives from the general recognition that “capabilities,” at least in the political realm, may not be fungible and are context dependant[11]. If this is true, then a simple status ordering of capabilities will not identify the truly most powerful entities in a system, unless one has first assessed the situation and the resources deemed to be most valuable in that situation. The weakness of this approach to power as strategies, therefore, consists of making all analysis sensitive to the context within which the strategies take place[12].

Moving beyond capabilities and context, the third approach to power – understood as outcomes focuses on whether the targeted entities respond in the manner intended by the initiator. The claim of power in this approach rests simply on whether the initiator was able to influence the targeted entity to act in the desired way, even if the latter is acting against its own interests. Such a concept of power comports the intuitive human sense of what it means to be powerful – making the other do as you want – as the ability of A to get B do something A wouldn’t otherwise do[13]. However, the notion of power as outcomes also has certain limitations: these include the problems of accommodating uncertainty about B’s original preferences and how changes in those preferences might alter B’s actions irrespective of A’s threats or coercion[14].

From these basic concepts, the question rises as to of how to properly asses national power in any of the given models. A classical paradigm is Morgenthau’s, which defines the essence of national power as a combination of elements (capabilities and strategies in this case). These are geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character and national morale, quality of diplomacy and of governance[15]. But this is not the only one. More recently, Susan Strange whose preoccupations in the field of international political economy raised it to the rank of area of study offered a similar view on power as a combination between strategies and capabilities[16].

After the above conceptualization of power and national power, I will pass on to knowledge. This is one of the most controversial concepts in the history of ideas, as to the general acceptance of its sense. Starting with the Aristotelian notions of doxa and episteme, the term knowledge still didn’t find a commonly agreed meaning, proving to still be in a continuous evolution.  In the 20th century, Bertrand Russel’s defined knowledge as “a belief which is in agreement with the facts defined, constituting a relation between two or more concepts, where concepts are mental objects who only exists in relation with a conceptualizer, intelligent being”[17]. A definition alike comes from Loet Leydersdorf, who believes that: “knowledge enables us to codify the meaning of information which can be more or less meaningful given the perspective”[18]

Putting the mentioned elements of national power in relation with knowledge, it is axiomatic that knowledge influences at least the non-perennial elements of national power: industrial capacity, military preparedness, national character and morale, quality of diplomacy and governance. The knowledge/political elite doublet should be articulated with respect to the capabilities/ strategies pair reported to the above description of power and the outcomes. Just like in a game of poker, knowledge represents the high cards (capabilities), while political elite the player who decides what strategy to follow. In the end, the outcomes reveal whether the chosen strategy was fortunate or not. Nonetheless, it is more probable to win if you hold good cards than contrary.

  At a national level, knowledge can only determine the elements of power through “conceptualizers” – who are in fact the depositaries of knowledge. Thus, a social network is a social structure made of individuals who are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, knowledge in our case. This social network of scientists (depositaries of knowledge) is influenced by the political elite - another social network who possesses power over the mechanisms to allocate resources in a society and thus to favor or disadvantage through their policies.

After reviewing the above mentioned ideas, by considering unilaterally the effect of knowledge upon national power, the latter is ultimately a result of the interaction between two components: a country’s ability to dominate the cycles of innovation at a given point in time and to utilize the fruits of this domination for effective military capabilities[19]. These in turn, reinforce the existing economic/social/cultural etc. advantages and produce a stable political order which maintains the country’s own strategic advantage[20].

  How certain countries come to achieve dominance in some leading  sectors is a complex phenomenon, but evidence suggests that entities achieving such dominance in the past were those with:  relatively efficient domestic markets that enabled smooth access to resources and credit; relatively open societies that encouraged economic innovation and encouraged creativity; relatively ordered institutional arrangements for safeguarding property rights and ensuring peaceful dispute resolution; conscientious political leadership that valued power and control in international politics; sensitivity to global competition and responsiveness to the international problems of the time[21]. Evidence also suggests that dominance in a certain innovation area is never permanent or timeless, as diffusion, imitation, and competitive innovations occurring elsewhere combines with the phenomenon of diminishing returns and leads to the decline of preexisting leaders and the rise of new competitors[22]. Even though the advantages in successful innovations may never be permanent over historical time, they are usually substantial enough to allow their possessors to utilize these resources to develop “hegemonic potential” in the form of effective military forces[23].

To finally frame the concepts of political elites, knowledge and national power, I ascertain national power as a state actor’s capacity to follow strategic goals through pertinent action. This view of national power suggests two distinct, but related dimensions of capacity: an external dimension, which consists of a nation’s capacity to affect the global environment through its economic, political, cultural and military potential, and an internal dimension, which consists of a nation’s capacity to transform the resources of its society into “actionable knowledge” that produces the best civilian and military innovations. These dimensions must to be understood as entwined[24].

My hypothesis: US political elites’ decision to directly support knowledge during WWII, indirectly boosted American national power during the war, follows a dialectic process of demonstration within the above constructed frame:  at first, “national capabilities/resources”, represent the elements a country needs to innovate and increase its hegemonic potential by the creation of various new technologies, means of organization etc.[25]. This leads to the development of a national performance, understood as the more or less efficient operation of converting crude resources conversion to value added ones like technologies, human resources, capital etc.[26]. Third, the “military capability,” seeks to capture the manifest signs of national power that are ultimately personified by the combat proficiency of a country. In the end, “military capability” strengthens both national resources -by becoming a resource to obtain new others (ex. by imperialistic endeavors), and national performance. Military capabilities are hence interaction result between national resources and national performance: resources may be base, but these have to be converted by human craft, which is captured, however imperfectly, in the domain of national performance[27]. The last stage gives birth to raw national power.

In the following pages, I shall test my hypothesis following the next flow: political elite (starting factor) à national capabilities/resources (knowledge) à national performance (knowledge conversion) à military capabilities (knowledge converted) à national power (outcome) thus fitting the chosen case study – WWII United States, within the constructed framework.



Between 1939 and 1945, US attitude towards involvement in the World War evolved from indirect implication, by only helping the Allies with resources, to direct involvement after 1942 when US came in direct confrontation with the Axis Powers.  My aim is to present the US double helix of Government-University relation (emphasis on political and scientific elite) and its link to national power.  In my demonstration, I will follow the aforementioned order: political elite à national capabilities à national performance à military capabilities à national power.   

The relative power of US in world affairs during the interwar years was in an inverse relation to many of its European peers, especially Germany or USSR. US were strong in the 1920s, but declined more than any other Great Power during the depressed 1930s, recovering only partially to the 1920s level at the end of this decade[28].

The reason for preeminence in the first decades of the 20th century is obvious: US were the only major country, apart from Japan, to benefit from WWI. It became the world’s leading financial and creditor nation, in addition to being the world’s largest producer of manufactures. It had by far the largest stocks of gold. It had a domestic market so extensive that massive economies of scale could be practiced by giant firms and distributors, especially in the booming auto industry. Its high standards of living and its availability of investment capital interacted in mutual beneficial fashion to spur of further heavy investment in manufacturing industry, since consumer demand could absorb virtually all of the goods which increased productivity offer. In 1929, for example, US produced 4, 5 million vehicles while France 211.000, Britain 182.000 and Germany 117.000[29]. At the end of the 1920s, US was producing “a larger output than that of the other six Great Powers taken together” and “her overwhelming productive strength was further underlined by the fact that gross value of manufactures produced per individual was nearly twice as high as in Great Britain or Germany, and more than ten to eleven times as high as the USSR or Italy”[30]. But the US political influence in the world was in no respect commensurated with her extraordinarily industrial strength, from mainly two reasons. First, US rejected a leading role in the world politics, because its interests were not affected by the actions of the other states. Second, for the absolute increases of imports and exports, their place in its national economy was not large, simply because the country was self sufficient; in fact, the proportion of manufactured goods exported in relation to their total production decreased from 10 to 8% in 1929[31]. Except in respect to certain raw materials, the world outside was of no importance to American prosperity. To sum up, US was not interested by the rest of the world because she was self-sufficient and did not felt the existence of a major threat for its interests.

The economic might of the US suffered a shock with the financial collapse of 1929. The GNP dropped from $98, 4 billion in 1929 to a half 3 years later. The value of manufactured goods in 1933 was less than ¼ what it had been in 1929. Nearly 15 million workers had lost their jobs and more without any means of support. During the same period the value of American exports had decreased from $5, 24 billion to 1, 61, a fall of 69%. World trade collapsed generally, but the US share of foreign commerce contracted even faster, from 13, 8% in 1929 to less than 10% in 1932. What was more, while certain other major powers recovered output by the middle to late 1930s; the US suffered a further severe economic convulsion in 1937. So that, because of the drift towards trading blocs which were much more self contained than in the 1920s, this second American convulsion did not hurt other countries so severely. The overall consequence was that in the years of the Munich crisis, the US share of world manufacturing output was lower than at any time since around 1910[32]. Because of the severity of this second slump and because of the declining share of foreign trade in the GNP, American policy under Hoover and Roosevelt became even more introspective.

In terms of political elite’s attitude to science, a great shift took place in the period before WWII, during and after it. Academic research in science and engineering was not considered a federal responsibility; almost all support came from private contributions and charitable foundations. Governmental research into science and technology was largely uncoordinated, just to take the example of the military research which was not centralized to the point where different branches were often working on the same subject even without knowing it. In the period immediately before WWII, a growing awareness current rises at the level of the political elites that America’s military capability owes a great deal its strength in science and engineering. Indeed, science community draws the signal by pointing the research weapons taken by others. An example is the famous letter Albert Einstein sent to President Roosevelt where he explains that Germany advances to build the atomic bomb. The letter is dated August 2nd 1939, 1 month before the war starts[33]. At the same time, Congress begins considering several proposals to provide federal support to research, namely science and engineering. Separately, firm action is needed. President Roosevelt decides to sponsor the creation of several organizations to coordinate federal funding of science for the purposes of war, including the National Research Defense Committee and the Office of Scientific Research and Development.     

As mentioned above, around 1937-1938, Roosevelt himself seems to have become more worried about the fascist threat, even if American public opinion and economic difficulties restrained him for taking the lead. By 1938, secret Anglo-American naval talks were taking place about how to deal with the twin challenges of Japan and Germany. Roosevelt soon started to press for large scale increases in defense expenditures. Rearmament measures resulted in almost doubling the aircraft production between 1937 and 1938, a massive expansion of the fleet, increasing the number of tests for the fabrication of B-17 bombers and grappled the plans for an amphibious and armored warfare. A that time US begins construct their first tank[34].

Awakening of the US sleeping giant after 1938 represented a confirmation of the importance  national resources and national performance (coped with timing as well) have for endorsing military capabilities, if political will. US started to close the armament gap opened up by the fascist states spending. And that it could outspend any country if there is political will was clear: as late as 1939, US defense composed only 11,7% of total expenditures and a mere 1,5% of GNP, percentage far less than of any other Great power[35].

US became a country with huge national capabilities at the end of the 1930s and the same came be told for their national performance. Thus, military capability turned not only into an issue of shire number (e.g. how many airplanes US poses); but more importantly than number, it was an issue of finesse which involved knowledge and at this stage the role of the scientific community (so to say of knowledge) for the national power proved its importance. A-Bomb, Radar, proximity fuse just to give few examples, could have prolonged the WWII indefinitely or even turned its tide if it would have been discovered first by the Axis powers. 

Catalyst of the scientific social network was Vannevar Bush, who organized the American technological and scientific community as head of National Defense Committee and of the Office for Scientific Research and Development. Bush, an intimate friend of Roosevelt, took the position of science advisor of the president with broad mandate to advise him on the effects of science and technology at the level of domestic and international affairs. It is important to note this function was created in 1939, when political elites came aware of the knowledge and organizational gap between US and the powers of the Axis.

Vannevar Bush was an MIT engineer who distinguished himself in 1928 with the invention of the differential analyzer, the predecessor of nowadays computers; he aims was to put in practice Leibniz’s idea from Monadology, of the automat[36]. In 1939 he published the essay “As we may think” where he predicts the appearance of Internet and Cyberspace. In 1937 he is chosen as president of the Committee for Scientific Aid within Carnegie Foundation; here he meets James Conant, the president of Harvard and Frank Jewett, the president of Bell Labs.   At same time, being chair of the Division of Engineering and Industry Research of the National research Council, Bush’s declared purpose is to find links between science, engineering, industry and military in order to provide US with advance weaponry for soon-coming war[37].

In January 1939 he takes the lead of the Carnegie Institution in Washington DC and around same time joined the National Advisory Committee for aeronautics, involved in every development involving aircraft since its founding in 1915[38]. By 1940, he authors a proposal for the creation of a National Defense Research Committee, proposal approved by Roosevelt on the spot. In June 1940, the NDRC takes birth under direct supervision and funding of the White House[39].

By mid 1941, NDRC is incorporated in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, financed by the Congress. The NDRC/OSRD launched a massive program of weapons and research development. They externalized research towards universities, with the exception of two projects:  Radiation Lab- developing radar and, of course, the sites of producing the atomic bomb. OSRD is a hybrid organization, working both as a decentralized and centralized organization under a centralized rule. By 1944, OSRD spends 3 million $ a week, financing 6000 researchers in 300 labs. Task to convince the military of the importance of civilian scientist was not difficult with the appearance of the new inventions: radar, proximity fuse, A-Bomb. Bush even wanted to push forward to include scientist in the formulation of military strategy, but the war ended and under Truman’s leadership he lost a lot of his influence[40].

But before the war ended, Bush was asked by the president to write a report in which to explain what do the US have to do in the scientific domain in order not to loose its primacy in the world. In 1944, Bush published “Science: the endless frontier” in which he proposes the establishment of a National Research Foundation that would centralize all federal research to ensure scientific advancement, military preparedness and precise decision making by the government. In this paper, Bush also asserted that America’s national security and future depended upon guidance, if not rule, by scientific and technologic elite[41].

US military capabilities lean the balance of power between 1943 and 1945 in favor of the Allies and the new inventions obviously played a crucial part. Radar for instance gave Britain the upper-hand in the Battle of England against the Luftwaffe and the Atlantic submarine war from; crack of the German Enigma code of communication in 1944, represented a similar breakthrough. And finally, it is considered that without the use of the A-Bomb in Japan, WWII  would had lasted at least one year more and would had cost Allies another one million soldiers.

From 1939 to 1945 America passed from an anti-war attitude of the public opinion to a determined involvement in combat of the whole society. In the end, after war ended, US assumed to rebuild the societies of its former allies and at the same time the role of leader of the Western Civilization. The important part played by knowledge when supported by the will of political elite, with the creation of  NDRC/ OSDR and their associates turned obvious with the war use of the crucial innovations developed.





My declared purpose at the beginning of this work was to find if any connection between political elites, knowledge and national power. By testing  my hypothesis on a  historical case-study- US during World War II, it came obvious not only that knowledge is in a direct relation with national power, but that it can boost national power in an exponential manner. At the same time, knowledge has no standalone existence, but is in a dependency relation with political elite’s will: it has to be promoted, supported and organized in order to produce effects.  I have only referred to US in this paper and brought in discussion the way in which A-Bomb or Radar impacted US’ supremacy; but knowledge’s impact to national power is obvious in wartime Germany as well, when the extensive use of U-Boots during 1942 created a catalyst effect for the German national power, just to take another example.

At the same time, national power is an entwinement of national resources, national performance and military capabilities, but in order for these to effect the national power, political will organize them in an efficient manner. In a war limit situation the stated three elements should complement political elite’s understanding of the situation or whole national being is at risk. American policy of creating a network that centralized all scientific development to protect the well-being status of the nation, proved its results.

To conclude, it is my belief that in the passing from the industrial society to post industrialism was rooted in the 1939-1945 US. The massive investments and organization of the knowledge sector in the war period represented the premises of moving to the next level of societal organization. It is true that national resources and national performance had their importance for US in the process of imposing themselves as the leading power, but knowledge represented the catalyst, the something which made possible the evolution from good to great.   In this respect, I stress that the US policy of knowledge endorsement was (and is) in fact the main determinant of their national power.





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[1] Alvin TOFFLER, Al treilea val, Z Publishing, Bucureşti, 1996.

[2] Daniel BELL, The Coming of Post Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Basic Books, New York, 1973.

[3] Paul A. C. KOISTINEN, “Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century”, Reviews in American History, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1998, pp. 606-613.

[4] Hans J. MORGENTHAU, Politica între naţiuni, Polirom, Iaşi, 2007, pp. 143-203.

[5] Joseph NYE, “Limits of the American power”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 4, 2002-2003, p. 548.

[6] Raymond BOUDON, François BOURRICAUD, A Critical Dictionary of Sociology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989, pp. 267-268.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Rudolph J. RUMMEL, The Dimensions of Nations, Sage, Beverly Hill, 1972, pp. 20-25.

[9] Raymond BOUDON, François BORRICAUD, A Critical… cit., p. 268.

[10] Ronald S. BURT, “Power in a Social Topology”, in Ronald J. LIEBERT, Allen W. IMERSHEIN (eds.), Power, Paradigms, and Community Research, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1977, pp. 251-334.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Ibidem.

[13] Robert DAHL, “The Concept of Power”, Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1957, p. 202.

[14] Ibidem, p. 203.

[15] Hans J. MORGENTHAU, Politica...cit., pp. 143-203.

[16] See for instance Susan STRANGE, States and Markets, Pinter Publishers, London, 1988 or The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996.

[17] Bertrand RUSSELL, Human Knowledge: Its Search and Its Limits, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 5-12.

[18] Loet LEYDESDORF, The Knowledge Based Economy: Modeled, Measured, Simulated, Universal Publishers, Boca Raton, Florida, 2006, p. 16.

[19] Joseph A. SCHUMPETER, Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1934, p. 66.

[20] Ibidem.

[21] George MODELSKI, William THOMPSON, Leading Sectors and World Powers, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1996, pp. 51–62.

[22] Karen RASLER, William THOMPSON, “War and the Economic Growth of  Major Powers” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, 1985, pp. 513–538.

[23] Ibidem.

[24] Anthony GIDDENS, The Nation-State and Violence, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, p. 121-130.

[25] Barry BUZZAN, Richard LITTLE, Sistemele Internaţionale în Istoria Lumii, Polirom, Iaşi, 2009, pp. 19-35.

[26] Ibidem.

[27] Ibidem.

[28] Paul KENNEDY, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Unwin Hyman Publisher, London, 1988, pp. 320-333.

[29] Ibidem.

[30] Ibidem.

[31] Ibidem, pp. 320-333.

[32] Ibidem.

[33] Dr. Einstein’s Letter to President Roosevelt, on, accessed on 28.10.2013, at 11.19AM.

[34] Jack LEVY, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1983, pp. 417-423.

[35] Ibidem.

[36] Stanley GOLDBERG, “Inventing a Climate of Opinion: Vannevar Bush and the Decision to Build the Bomb”, Isis, Vol. 83, No. 3, 1992, pp. 429-452.

[37] Ibidem.

[38] Ibidem.

[39] Ibidem.

[40] Ibidem, pp. 429-452.

[41] Ibidem.