Populism and Democratic Values

 

Marin DRĂMNESCU

LUMINA – The University of South-East Europe

 

Abstract: Populism has become a well defined attitude-movement in Central and Eastern Europe, integrating this space into a European phenomenon increasingly wide-spread. In most countries of Europe through their discourse, populist politicians exploit social frustration generated by economic problems by showing the main culprits: corruption, political elitism and immigrants. Against this backdrop, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, they systematically attack democratic institutions, the parliament, court decisions, and the justice system in its entirety, central banks, political neutrality of public servants and the independence of the media. And all this in the name of the people, instilling the idea that the decisions made are fair and effective, and trying to satisfy the subjective demands of the population, understood as a homogeneous, unitary body. From this perspective, populism becomes an attitude favourable to the fulfillment of the wishes of the people, against their real interests.

Keywords: populism, populist rhetoric, erosion of democracy, charismatic

leader.

 

 

$11.       INTRODUCTION

Populism, as a type of manifestation, has always accompanies all forms of government and all political regimes, ever since their beginning, but it has the most profound impact on democratic organisations. It is obvious that in the political landscape of Europe in general populism is increasingly present in both speech and attitude. It appears, emerges and grows ever more strongly in places where representative democracy faces a lack of solutions, partial failures, giving illusions to those who can no longer produce answers within the limits of their power of understanding and adaptation.

Populism is a frequently used concept in the study of politics, a concept that has different meanings depending on the context or the author who uses it[1]. Most experts recognise the difficulty of achieving a consensus on the imposition of a clear definition given to the populist phenomenon, as it presents the quality of being understood differently in different situations. Thus, populist behaviours can be expressed in a diverse political spectrum, either by the right-wing or by the left, they can trigger reforms, may occur either in urban or rural areas, and can engage energies from both the progressive and conservative camp[2]. These manifestations have no invariant, no specific constant, being multi-classial[3], and poorly organised.

$12.       POPULISM BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Due to the fact that the term of populism is etymologically rooted in the Latin populus (people) it might be assumed that it refers to popular movements, reactions, attitudes, groups or manifestations, or to regimes or leaders who have, claim or voice a certain affinity with the people[4]. From another point of view, populist rhetoric tends to be a collection of assertions belonging simultaneously to the right and left, with a strong emphasis on leadership, on the one hand, and popular equality, on the other hand.As a rule, the populist message conveyed is illiberal and intolerant to traditional civil liberties[5]. It can be stated that the populist leader appeals to the people positioning himself against the existing political system, in an attempt to achieve a project, usually a utopian one[6].

Depending on the approach and the definition used, different authors have compiled various lists of political personalities that fall into the category of populist leaders, according to certain criteria.In a general sense, the adjective populist defines a person who seeks to gain popularity, to attract followers, supporters and admirers through facile means, through promises not anchored in the concrete daily reality.

From a traditional perspective, populism is considered a political doctrine whose stated aim is to defend the interests of ordinary people against an elite who has given up or who neglects or partially fulfills its assumed roles.

If there is anything that binds populists of all countries, it is their anti-system discourse. That is how they all started: challenging the political and social system, the dominant economic structures, and political, cultural or religious institutions. They used their weaknesses or operating flaws, exploited the legitimate discontent of citizens in order to penetrate the system, to take it over and use it in their own interest”.[7]

The researches in the field of political psychology associate populism with the failure of representative democracy. According to Alexandre Dorna,

 

“The waning of the values ​​of modernity and the collapse of democratic values ​​are the main factors that legitimised the spread to a larger scale of manipulation and demagoguery - favorite tools of populists from everywhere and of all time”.[8]

Populist attitude, argues the French professor, develops and manifests itself under the pressure of a multidimensional generalised crisis, which facilitates the effortless manipulation of masses byan elite that is losing more and more contact with the concrete reality”.[9]

According to A. Dorna, today’s society is confronted with a new populist cycle[10]. The viral expansion of populism was possible due to the globalisation of the market economy which has become the most rapid and most effective way of contamination.

The erosion of democratic mechanisms, the dysfunctions of state institutions, corruption, and the growing manifest contempt of political, economic and even cultural elites for ordinary citizens have encouraged the return at full blast of populism. In front of this invading energy governments are paralysed, non-reactive and hesitant. Since current ideologies are reduced to electoral and economic calculations, intellectual elites have withdrawn from political life favoring the penetration into the State’s decision-making mechanisms of persons animated by interests other than those of the community. Political strategies are becoming or have become personal in the absence of a rational project, of a coherent vision, or of a collective ideal.

As a political phenomenon, populism did not arise from nothing but it is the natural outcome of the culmination of a stage of exhaustion, trivialisation and cultural and ideological exhaustion of the elites in power. Frustration, constant disappointment, repeated deception and expectation without any hope to cling to are the key factors conducive to the recrudescence of this phenomenon.

In the essence of its manifestation, populism is not a symptom of the end of a system or of the start of another system, but it appears as an indicator of the corrosion and weakening of the consistency of a democratic governanment. Treating this indicator with indifference can generate the coagulation of the energies of crowds or large groups and their visceral manifestation, without any direction, without a coherent programme, and without precise targets, animated only by “the desire to get rid of the defiance of an arrogant, useless political elite and of the anguish it causes to those masses”.[11]In the populist acception, the only element that might cause the dilution of the whole nation’s anguish is the emergence of a strong and charismatic leader, champion of the people and of its will, and whose beliefs, attitudes, behaviours and speeches might depressurise and dissipate the generalised anxiety.

Social cohesion has always a psychological, and not a sociological or economic componant. Against this backdrop the populist leader emerges as the symbolic and heroic embodiment of the crowd’s irrational expectations. Being essentially a charismatic character, his speech addressed especially to those wronged, poor, and humiliated becomes mobilizer, operational and concretised in more often than not undemocratic acts. Through his conduct and the concepts conveyed, he makes more or less deliberately reference to fundamental myths. This manifest urge becomes particularly acute due to the individual’s need of myths. In other words, the need of understandable life models whose presence, even if only symbolic, confers motivation and a higher meaning to human existence and an explanation of or a direction to social action.

Yet myth is nothing but an imaginary history. It does not evoke the past as it was (the historical dimension) but as we would have liked it to be (the imaginary dimension). The major problem arises when more or less willingly it is taken for history[12].

The symbols mentioned in populist speeches spur the collective awakening through re-remembrance, re-recognition and reference to that historical imaginary context with antidepressive impact. Populist rhetoric, sometimes accompanied by demagogy, proposes and supports a vision of a desirable future, built upon emotional images wherein the populist leader assumes the role of agent of transformation by supporting those to whom he proposes a model to identify with[13].

Having lost trust in institutions, becoming first skeptical and suspicious, and later apathetic, resigned and indifferent as to the behaviour and the lawfulness of the decisions made by these institutions, individuals promptly accept those messages based on early anticipation of what they want to hear.

From this point of view, populism is more than a simple movement of the masses, it is rather the reaction of the masses to a critical situation and to the appeal, felt as heroic, of a charismatic leader who opposes the power by mobilising the entire nation.

For Philippe C. Schmitter populism is a political movement centred on a leader who claims that he is able to find solutions to problems previously regarded as impossible to be solved[14]. Schmitter examines 14 characteristics of populism, grouped in seven virtues and respectively in seven vices[15].

Table 1. Populism: virtues and vices

 

Virtues

Vices

Compels traditional system parties to reform, adapt and renew themselves;

By customising politics excessively, populism can have dismantling effects on the party system;

Influences the public agenda, by bringing to the forefront until then ignored issues;

Overstressesthe emotional at the expense of the rational;

Mobilises thecitizensotherwisepoliticallyapathetic;

Arouses oversised expectations;

Emphasises the personal qualities of politicians, bringing them out of the party cocoon;

Extraterritorialises responsibilities that actually belong to the people whom it exalts;

Presents a quick and effective decision-making model, for it is not bureaucratic;

Encourages electoral opportunism to the detriment of accountability;

Calls into question a number of external constraints that have become over time legitimate and accepted;

Requireshasty decisions, inarticulatedprogrammatically;

Populist parties, being devoid of political force, disappear rather quickly from the political arena, leaving behind a reinvigorated party system.

It can easily lead to the degeneration of democracy, leading it towards dictatorship.

 

In Philippe Schmitter’s vision, populism comprises in a fair and equal manner both advantages and disadvantages.Schmitter argues that populism destroys established or consented loyalties, affects rational choices between different political programmes without substituting them with something of its own, that it influences and recruits uninformed people without crystallised preferences and who prefer to obtain emotional satisfactions from those who lead them at the expense of pragmatic actions, that it makes promises and creates expectations which cannot be fulfiled, and that it identifies foreigners, minorities, immigrants, etc. as determining factors of its own failures. Populists can affect the rules of the democratic game through the support they receive from the Army or security forces, in other words, they cannot be removed peacefully from the helm of the country[16].

Moreover, the above mentioned author shows that through their actions populists have also positive sides, in that:

 

“[…]populist parties and movements dismantle sclerotic partisan loyalties and dissolve party systems based on illegal, undemocratic collusion, recruit previously apathetic and passive persons, and mobilise them in the elections;by the concern attached to certain disparate or ignored political issues populists encourage the articulation of demands and hidden cleavages, replace political immobilism, and broaden  the sphere of possible political solutions to collective problems; finally, when they are defeated in the elections, they leave room to a reinvigorated party system”.[17]

On the one hand,

“Populists call into question the rule of law, the separation of powers and the autonomy of various social bodies, such as universities or religious cults, relying excessively on the dominance of the executive power and not providing guarantees for its limitation. On the other hand, nor do populists’ attacks against the institutions of liberal democracy spare the legal guarantees of rights and freedoms of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities”.[18]

 

These groups become quite often targets of extremist manifestations as a result of favorable political conditions, and of their identification as enemies by populist leaders in search of new groups waiting to be excluded from the narrow ethno-nationalist and conservative definition of the nation in both Western and Eastern Europe”.[19]However, populism may promote or exacerbate political extremism, which raises serious questions to the supporters of liberal democracy[20]: How to define, understand, monitor and manage populism?In what conceptual framework can we talk about populism and from what viewpoint can it be analysed in order to understand it more deeply: ethical, political, sociological, psychological, interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary? Can populism be tackled as a distinct, stable ideology, with certain invariants which would define it?Can populism be perceived as a kind of generalised attitude-discourse, structured on a logic belonging to a psychological profile or to a personality exacerbated by the persistence of dominant features which can be identified?To what extent is populism an attitude with contaminating valences, generating certain effects?To what extent is a populist political discourse generated by the transitional stages of societies or by the failures of political regimes, governments or by state institutions or by particular economic and cultural conditions?Is there a recrudescence of populism and which are the correlations that can be deduced from the analysis of the incentive causes and of the stimulating environment?

 

 

$13.       INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN DEMAGOGUERY AND POPULISM

From a general point of view, the demagogue is an individual whose speech contains false promises and phrases deeply imbued emotionally by dint of which he creates his popularity.

The term of demagoguery refers to an actional model of political strategy through which political power can be won and maintained. This type of strategy speculates the public’s fears, anxieties and hopes, by consistently using rhetoric and propaganda techniques, appealing to nationalist or populist themes through which the demagogue’s popularity and image are amplified.The intention of the demagogic speech is to determine an observer or a listener who is little or not at all informed to draw a conclusion, to form an opinion which would meet his expectations based less on reality and more on his own expectations. From this point of view, in the demagogic discourse can be inserted fallacies, half-truths, omissions or distortions of a message, partial truths, and emotional images in order to obtain political advantages.In the demagogic discourse persuasion is achieved by appeals to emotions rather than to reason.

A comparative analysis of the demagogic and populist message (Table 2), led Guy Hermet to identify five main differences that refer to: the type of relation that the emitters of the two speeches claim to maintain with the people; the emotional register in which they are situated; the diagnosis of the risks the people is exposed to; the nature of the political offer and position vis-à-vis democracy.

Table 2. Characterisation of political discourse through differentiation[21]

Criterion

Populist

Demagogic

Relation with the people

Embodiment of the true people by the message emitter

No embodiment; the emitter is the people’s benefactor

Register of the discourse

Affective and of proximity

The advantages offered are significant, not the discourse

Diagnostic

Reality described in a denouncing manner

No description of reality, no genuine accusation

Nature of the political offer

Simple curative antipolitical solution

Anouncing the immediate benefits with no argumentative discourse

Position

Need of a deep reform

Silence.Privileged framework of demagoguery

 

As can be seen, populism appears to be less an ideology and more a political attitude-movement which mobilises and directs the population against a government or an institution, with a view to ​​defending it against a real or supposed injustice or aiming to repair some injustice.

Regardless of the political belief manifested in action or discourse (left wing, right wing or center), populism seeks to unite and fight against corrupt dominant elites (usually the political class) and their allies (potentates of the day, intellectuals, national or local celebrities, etc.).The progress of populist actions is animated by the real or declared belief that political and social goals are best achieved through the direct action and involvement of the masses.

From the perspective of political psychology, populism appears as a general type of discourse developed by a general human mental typology, which contains within itself difficulties to adapt and integrate the individual in the community, such as: anxiety, rejection manifested to societal change or nostalgic nuances after stages thought to be beneficial.

This type of discourse is recurrently expressed on the political scene, in various forms, depending on the context. This speech appears rather as an attitudinal response to the reality of a society that becomes gradually less accessible and more difficult to understand. On the other hand, the populist phenomenon can also be analysed from a historical perspective with reference to various political, social and cultural movements in the context of which it manifested itself.

In conclusion, we can say that populism can be seen and understood as a logical expression whereby certain socio-economic conditions are analysed and characterised. The logical construction of the discourse is based usually on the emphasis of the contrasts between backwardness and stagnation, decay and modernisation or the relationship between traditionalism and the imperative for change[22].

$14.       POPULISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

 

Although we are witnessing a recrudescence of the populist phenomenon in Eastern Europe, it transcends this space, and it can be found equally consistent in the Western socio-political environment as well. Thus, the increasing visibility of Western populist parties and movements is obvious, their success being due to the exploitation of social concerns related to the phenomenon of immigration, socio-economic insecurity, but also to a certain kind of manifestation of political elitism and corruption. There are voices that point to a specific connection between populism and the emergence and consolidation of right-wing extremism in Western Europe.

The worrying amplification of this phenomenon can be quantified by the systematic attacks on democratic institutions and the statements of governments and political parties that increasingly argue that they are and translate into experience the true voice of the people.From this hypostasis they downplay the role of liberal democratic institutions that interpose between them and the will of the people[23]. In the Eastern European space governments themselves criticise, contradict and despise court decisions which are contrary to their own interests, particularly those of constitutional courts.Political power does not hesitate to limit the freedom of the press if its interest so requires. On the other hand, if the same interest so requires, the professionalism of public servants is affected by their replacement with new officials, who are unqualified, politically obedient, but loyal[24].

In general, the attention of populists focuses either on certain social categories, ethnic groups, sexual minorities, or other groups that do not fall within the correct definition given to the people[25].

In Romania too, populism, increasingly evident after joining the NATO and the European Union, engenders certain risks for democracy, risks arising from the extension of this political phenomenon throughout the region.

According to D. Barbu, the etiology of this phenomenon can be found in Romania in that “Romanian society persisted, after December 22, 1989, to seek “anti-political” formulas of aggregation, populism being the first of these which turned up to the call”[26].According to the same author, populism delimits itself from nationalist demagogy and authoritarianism, being but an inability or lack of intent to distinguish between the interests of the people whom the government represents and the people’s inclinations to be shaped and channeled in accordance with a previously assumed political vision, between what is rationally useful for society and the irrational emotional impulses of the population.

Although the effects of populism on democracy are indirect, they are mediated and enhanced by the manifestations of public opinion in the form of extremist anti-minority attitudes, and affinity for conservative and socially authoritarian behavioural patterns.Through their non-democratic expression these behavioural and attitudinal patterns can jeopardise the institutions and practices of liberal democracy in Romania. The spread of populism in Europe is acknoledged as a current reality notwithstanding there is still no consensus on its impact on European societies. Ivan Krastev believes that “populism is a direct consequence of the tensions between liberalism and democracy, derived from the acute need for more direct democracy, on the one hand, and the multiplication of charismatic leaders able to coalesce popular dissatisfaction and frustration”.[27]

According to E. Jones, the common denominator of populists in the European countries is represented by the attacks initiated against political elites merged, in their opinion, into cartels[28].

In this vision, populists do not form parties but organise political movements, mobilise voters avoiding political activists, draw attention to minor issues but with a great emotional impact, being less interested in the consistency and substance of their political programmes.This way of being and of doing politics represents a real challenge to European democracy.

Concurrently with the populist rhetoric of the discourse is stimulated and shaped an authoritarian attitude, or a call for such an attitude.Against this background, in Romania and other countries of Eastern Europe decreases in the quality of democracy were recorded after the accession to the European Union[29].

Thus, after the first wave of accession to the European Union in 2004, J. Rupnik noticed the establishment of a worrying populism unmeasured as yet by Freedom House Index measuring instruments of democracy[30].

What became visible were the political understandings of extremist right-wing parties and populists in Slovakia and Poland, consistent populist movements in Hungary or political attacks against the freedom of mass media in Slovenia. Once reached the objective of European integration the policy of several Eastern European governments refused to recognise the separation of powers and the political neutrality of institutions, such as the central bank, the constitutional court, etc.

Eastern European populist discourse is directed against political and economic elites, believed to be the heirs of communist centres of power and influence.

At the level of the statements, populist speeches support and mobilise the energy of the masses against corruption and failure of a political system deemed as defective but in fact systematic attacks against democratic institutions are not at all something out of the ordinary. As a direct consequence, the Parliament has become, in the Romanian populists’ view, the legally protected space of manifestation of a corrupt political elite, and the justice system, a privileged and untouchable caste.

As a direct result of these populist actions against the Parliament, a referendum was organised calling for the reduction of the number of MPs and the appointment to the Constitutional Court of juges sharing particular political preferences. In the same context Statute for civil servants was amended creating the opportunity to appoint loyal people to public offices politicising thereby public administration.It is also noteworthy that the government decided to amend through ordinances and its own resolutions some organic laws while some laws voted in the Parliament by the parliamentary majority were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.The 2010 Freedom House Report certified a decrease in the quality of democracy in six new Member States, Romania being one of them.The overall FH score worsened noticeably after the elections of 2008, the quality of democracy dropping from the historical maximum of 3.29 in 2007 to 3.46 in 2010[31].

 

 

 

$15.       CONCLUSION

 

Although populism is not directly linked to the support of non-democratic alternatives, one may say that there is a certain interdependence between populism, anti-minority attitudes and the conservative attitudes of society.

Through the ability of populism to stimulate public awareness by radicalizing the extremists’ attitude, and by identifying and declaring certain social groups as enemies, the risk of its sharpening in Europe is becoming a major one.It is the main reason why populism is charged of promoting heightened hostility against socially excluded groups, such as migrant communities, sexual, religious or national minorities.

From the populist rhetoric it can be noted that the attacks against democratic institutions are radical. This makes the proposed corrective solutions to be as radical, aiming at “a fundamental change”[32]rejecting processuality, gradualism and compromise.On the other hand, due to its intrinsic anti-elitism, populism argues that political decisions should belong to ordinary people, i.e. to the people. The result of such a conduct is the reduction of the elite to a formal presence which would uselessly intermediate between the charismatic leader and the masses.

Claiming to hic et nunc solve major societal challenges, to provide simplistic, unrealistic solutions, deeply impregnated emotionally, populism shuns rationality, and has recourse to different types of symbols with a powerful impact on social perception. Pe acest fond, în momentele de criză, când sentimentul de comunitate se diluează și diferențele dintre simbolurile propuse și discursurile elitelor politice cresc, populismul se amplifică, se acutizează, devenind operant.

Bibliography

 

BARBU, Daniel, Republica absentă. Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004.

BUGARIC, Bojan, “Populism, liberal democracy, and the rule of law n Central and Eastern Europe”, in Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010.

COLȚESCU, Gabriela (coord.), Vocabular pentru societăți plural, Polirom, Iași, 2005.

DORNA, Alexandre, Fundamentele psihologiei politice, Comunicare.ro, Bucureşti, 2004.

DRAGOMAN, Dragoş, “Populism, autoritarism şi valori democratice în opinia publică din România”, in Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010.

GHERGHINA, Sergiu, Sergiu MIȘCOIU, Sorina SOARE, Populismul contemporan. Un concept controversat și formele sale diverse, Institutul European, Iași, 2012.

HERMET, Guy, Sociologia populismului, Artemis, Bucureşti, 2007.

JONES, Erik, “Populism in Europe”, SAIS Review, Vol. XXVll, No. 1, 2007.

KNIGHT, Alan, “Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico”, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1998.

KRASTEV, Ivan, “The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus”, in Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010.

LEVITZ, Philip, Grigore POP-ELECHEŞ, “Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s lmpact on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession”, in Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010.

PANTELIMON, V. Răzvan, “Populismul european post-Lisabona. Mit mediatic sau realitate”, Revista de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale a Academiei Române, Vol. IX, No. 2, 2012.

PANTELIMON, V. Răzvan, “Populism si neo-populism. Concept și practici”, Tendințe Actuale în Filozofia Politică, Institutul de Știinte Politice şi Relații Internaționale al Academiei Române, București, 2006.

POP-ELECHEŞ, Grigore, Romania’s Politics of Dejection”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001.

PUHLE, Hans Jürgen, “Populismo en América Latina”, Revista de Ciencia Politica, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1987.

RUPNIK, Jacques, “From democracy fatigue to populist backlash”, Journal of Democracy Vol. 18, No. 4, 2007.

SCHMITTER, Philippe, “Un bilanț al viciilor şi virtuților populismelor europene”, Dilema Veche, ediția online, No. 180, 23.07.2007.

SCHMITTER, Philippe, “A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of Populisms”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007.

TURCESCU, Lucian, Lavinia STAN, “Orthodoxy and EU Integration: Opportunity or Stumbling Block?”, Sfera Politicii, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 2010.



[1] Robert H. DIX, Populism: Authoritarian and Democratic”, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1985, p. 29.

[2] Răzvan V. PANTELIMON, Populismul european post-Lisabona. Mit mediatic sau realitate, Revista de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale, Vol 9, No. 2, 2012, pp. 15-29.

[3]Hans Jürgen PUHLE, Populismo en América Latina”, Revista de Ciencia Política, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1987, p. 88.

[4] Alan KNIGHT, Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico”,  Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1998, pp. 223-224.

[5] Gabriela COLȚESCU (coord.), Vocabular pentru societăți plurale, Polirom, Iași, 2005, pp. 180-187.

[6] Răzvan V. PANTELIMON, Populism si neo-populism. Concept și practici”, Tendințe Actuale în Filozofia Politică, Institutul de Știinte Politice si Relatii Internationale, Academia Română, Bucuresti, 2006, pp. 213-215.

[7] Guy HERMET, Sociologia populismului, Artemis, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 1.

[8] Alexandre DORNA, Fundamentele psihologiei politice, Comunicare.ro, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 229-230.

[9] Ibidem, p 229.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Adrian SEVERIN, Tranziţia democraţiei către populism” [http://basarabialiterara.com.md/?p=3807].

[13] Ibidem.

[14] Philippe C. SCHMITTER, Un bilanț al viciilor şi virtuților populismelor europene”, Dilema Veche, ediția online, No. 180, 23.07 2007.

[15] Răzvan V. PANTELIMON, Populismul european post-Lisabona...cit.”, pp. 15-29.

[16] Philippe SCHMITTER, A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of Populisms, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, pp. 5-10.

[17] Ibidem, p. 11.

[18] Bojan BUGARIC, Populism, Liberal Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Central and Eastern Europe” and Dragoş DRAGOMAN, Populism, autoritarism şi valori democratice în opinia publică din România, in Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010, pp. 301-302.

[19] Grigore POP-ELECHEŞ, Romania’s Politics of Dejection”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001, pp 157-166.

[20] Marc F. PLATTNER, “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy“, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 1 2010, pp. 81-92.

[21] Guy HERMET, Sociologia populismului, Artemis, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 70.

[22] Dragoş DRAGOMAN, Populism, autoritarism şi valori democratice în opinia publică...cit.”, pp. 300-305.

[23] Ibidem, p. 307.

[24] Ibidem, p. 312.

[25] Lucian TURCESCU, Lavinia STAN, Religion, Politics and Sexuality in Romania”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2005, pp. 292-309.

[26] Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă. Politicăşi societate în România postcomunistă, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 153.

[27] Ivan KRASTEV, The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 4, October 2007, pp. 56-61.

[28] Erik JONES, Populism in Europe”, SAIS Review, Vol. XXVll, No. 1, 2007, pp. 39-44.

[29] Philip LEVITZ, Grigore POP-ELECHEŞ, Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s lmpact on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2010, pp. 457-466.

[30] Jacques RUPNIK, From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2007, pp. 19-21.

[31] Dragoş DRAGOMAN, Populism, autoritarism şi valori democratice în opinia publică...cit.”, pp. 300-305.