Populism in Revolutionary Ukraine, between East and West

 

Taras DOBROVOLSKYY

Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest

 

Abstract: This article emphasizes the external interference in what we may call Ukrainian sovereignty. Who could say that Ukraine doesn’t have her choice? Many would say that this poor country is full of talents and freedom, which weren’t given by Russia or the EU, but by the people of Ukraine. In this revolutionary moment, as author of this article, I would say that my opinion is not objective or rational. My opinion is dear... to the people which desire to make their own future. Populism is cheap, but it’s not rational nationalism. In rational nationalism the true love prevails, and not hatred. Love to your country, women, children and ancestors. God bless the revolutionary events in Ukraine!

 

Keywords: populism, Ukraine, revolution, Ukrainian sovereignty, the European community.

 

 

1.   THE REVOLUTION’S BACKGROUND

Revolutionary Ukraine represents a good example of a population mobilized by its own forces and indignant in the face of the wrongdoing committed systematically to her by her authorities. All crimes are being perpetrated in conditions of a semi-feudal system and based on a profound ignorance of total economic and political elites versus the people’s requests. At least this seems to be the opinion shared by the majority of the supporters of the Maidan. On the other side of the political-ideological spectrum, fervent supporters of Ukraine’s integration into Russia’s major ideological project (Customs Union) or of the current Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, are presenting themselves to the public with accusations against “stray” revolutionaries, that they endanger the integrity and sovereignty of the Ukrainian State and come up with angry looks and with xenophobic responses to “the Russian brothers”. It is a populist interpretation of the current events in Ukraine, where we can easily realize the extent of the conflict. Many share the opinion that the conflict could degenerate into a civil war and culminate with the dissolution of Ukraine into two states.

The conflict, however, is not essentially ethnic, religious. Beyond the populist vision on Ukrainian events, one can assume that it is a riot, a political-ideological confrontation, originally started due to the Ukrainian policy-makers’ relinquishing the European vector of development, which subsequently turned into a great battle of a considerable part of the population against the regime. This confrontation is not taking place in terms of a civil war, because we do not have violent clashes between demonstrators, occurring systematically in Kiev or in other regions of the country.

In order to distance ourselves from the populism of revolutionary events and to understand the problem itself, it is not enough to keep oneself abreast only with recent developments. The key issue should rather be understood. Or, in terms of revolutionary Ukraine, it is important to make historical arguments for the hypothesis according to which that country is now the victim of a political confrontation unparalleled in the recent history of the Ukrainian people. After the initial stage of the political and ideological detachment from the structures of the former Soviet Union, the Ukrainian leadership has started creating a national state structures and institutional mechanisms of generating and promoting new rules and values. A major challenge was, at first, the establishment of a new type of political authority, different from previous experiences, as well as the initiation of democratization processes. Other challenges were the need to consolidate the processes of reforming the economy, democratic development and social integration of all citizens of the new State and in the presence of latent internal and external problems, just as happened in other former Soviet republics, heiresses of a difficult communist legacy.

Today, after the imperial protection fell apart and the Russian minority explicitly lost their political dominance, their self-awareness remained imperial, at least in the case of some of them. In many respects, the control over Ukraine was interpreted as a natural law that Moscow could enjoy in her relationship with Kiev. Hence the myriad of geopolitical projects supported by Moscow, in which Ukraine was a part, in spite of the dissatisfaction expressed by a large segment of the population. For that category of Ukrainian citizens who were dissatisfied and even outraged by finding Ukraine under the “protective wing” of Moscow, the country’s path was essentially European, in accordance with the principles and rules of the European Community.

This politico-ideological cleavage grew during the 1990s, when the majority of Ukrainian citizens consisted of the so-called “homo Sovieticus”. During the 2000s, especially in the second decade of the new millennium, the situation changed dramatically to the detriment of Moscow’s views on the fate of Ukraine. The new generation required increasingly clear the Europeanization of Ukraine and the final disposal of the communist past and the “protecting” attitude of Moscow. Political events precipitated and degenerated in the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005.

The factors and first effects of the Orange Revolution have to be researched and connected with Ukraine’s current situation. The factors that triggered the revolution in 2004 resemble in many ways the origins of phenomena that are developing nowadays – the discontentment of a population which is disappointed with politicians acting in favour of the Eastern vector, the forces that “stood and continue to stay behind” the revolution and have received/will receive its effects (being speculated the theory of geopolitical confrontation between Moscow and the West which was extended in Ukraine and which has major stakes linked to the outcome of the presidential election at the end of 2004 and the possible early parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014).

Unlike Westerners who are less accustomed to truly revolutionary political events and delight themselves with measured and predictable political processes, the citizens who voted for Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 had really astronomical expectations, remembering the revolutionary atmosphere of the Independence Square, the populist promises made by orange leaders on the welfare growth and combating orange old oligarchic clans and the allegations they released regarding the governors who were soon to be sitting on the opposition side.

The paradox of those past events seems to be found in the theory of the communist leader in Kiev, Piotr Simonenko, on the subsequent evolution of Ukraine, namely the perpetuation of a “Bermuda triangle” composed of Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko. According to the communists’ leader, these three political leaders represented the same oligarchic system of leadership of the country, but behind which each could be identified by different interest groups[1]. So, if we agree with Simonenko, the theory of conflict between those who have the power and those who struggle to get control of the country (both supporting the same system resource management) finds confirmation in Ukraine.

Although Ukraine has made efforts to create a legal, economic and social framework for protecting human rights, reality demonstrates that the achievements in this regard did not fully satisfy the needs of society. Faced with the acute economic and social difficulties, many citizens leave their country in search of better paid jobs, transforming the depopulation phenomenon into a serious threat to economic and societal stability.

Ukraine’s population has dropped from 51 million in 1991 to 46 million in 2013[2], which means a real tragedy for this country. The massive export of labour and the human trafficking have broken many communities and families in Ukraine, and have undermined human capital. Many Ukrainians believe that the main responsibility for these dramatic changes in the recent history of Ukraine belongs to the Kremlin because of the policy of deterring the integration of this country in Europe and of economic and political pressures, including energy shakedown. From this to revolution can be just a single step.

Sometimes, if the revolution is analysed according to the defined objectives starting from the populist statements of the parts involved in the great battle for the country’s rule, the revolution is a sudden and drastic change. It refers to the changes that may take place in the political and social system, but also at cultural and economic level. A great political revolution constitutes a forced replacement of a set of laws and institutions with others, while a social revolution consists in changing the social structure of a society. Often, political revolutions are to be accompanied by social revolutions, as associated objectives[3].

Nowadays many “big names” are mentioned in the press - Viktor Yanukovych, Vladimir Putin, Mykola (or Nikolai) Azarov, Catherine Ashton, Yaroslav Katczynski, John McCain and ultimately revolutionary leaders like Vitali Klitschko, Oleg Tiagnibok and Arseni Yatseniuk (or Arseniuk – the way the liberal-democrats’ leader in Russia, the controversial Vladimir Zhirinovsky, refers to him). All these characters actively participate in the great confrontation that takes place in Kiev’s Independence Square and other regions of the country. Each camp comes with certain prescriptions for a dignified life, for Ukraine’s true prosperity. If we give credence to one of the sides, changing or keeping the political status quo is the stake of the confrontation, but also a precondition for the true prosperity of the Ukrainian people. Some qualify it as a nation. It is certain that, in a populist context, the revolutionary moment represents a salvation or an immediate settlement of all issues.

However, the process of democratization, especially if it is deployed in a country like Ukraine, is not always compatible with the immediate and steady paced economic growth. In addition to the modernization of political life and democratization, the political instability and economic depression are the natural effects of the regime change. Along with taking power, the new political forces find themselves with a series of problems inherited from the previous administration, many of which stem from the very mentality of Ukrainians and reflect a crisis of the social and economic system of the country as a whole, and not just a result of the activities of political elites that ceded the power. Not incidentally, even in the first year after changing the administration as a consequence of the Orange Revolution of 2004, some newspapers have begun to use more often the phrase “Orange depression” and allusions that the revolution was in fact the replacement of an oligarchy with another one which is becoming more and more numerous. At least for the time being, the lesson seems to break Ukraine out of the textbooks on the theory of democracy. It is unrealistic to imagine that you can strengthen democracy with a single revolution[4].

What is certain is that the exaggerated enthusiasm specific to the authors of a revolution (be it peaceful, simulated or bloody) is gradually replaced by some degree of population dissatisfaction against the measures taken by the new power in the post-revolutionary period, but also by misunderstandings within the new team of the Government. Moreover, the current stage might be characterized by multiple divisions within the opposition leaders’ team in Kiev. It is lacking a recognized leader of an absolute majority. Each forms an electorate that feels relatively comfortable and sometimes refuses to recognize the methods practiced by his fellow opposition supporters. There are also differences between opposition leaders with regard to the content of the constitutional reform, although all of them argue that its implementation should not be delayed[5]. In another sense, UDAR party leader, Vitali Klitschko, who speaks Russian and is having difficulties of expression in Ukrainian, would have few common elements in addressing the crowd with an ultra-nationalist leader as the Svoboda party leader, Oleg Tiagnibok.

2.   RELIGIOUS SOLIDARITY, IN SUPPORT OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES

Despite the differences between opposition leaders, we cannot ignore the fact that the events in Ukraine reflect the tremendous support of the population in order to achieve a historic goal. This assumption is confirmed by the presence of demonstrators in Central Kiev, the insistence on promoting their ideas and, not least, the religious solidarity with the Maidan stage. A group composed of representatives of various denominations in Ukraine climbed the Maidan stage on 21 January, refusing to comply with the Government’s “shameful” orders. They prayed together and morally supported the protesters. Memorable is the presence of religious leaders who in other circumstances would not unite in this manner, on the stage being present representatives of the main religions in Ukraine – the protestant Bishop and pastor of the “New Life” Church, Anatoly Kalyuzhniy, the representative of the Muslim community in Ukraine, Ahmad Tamim, the leader of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), Bishop Vladimir, Rabbi Yaakov Dov Bleich, head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Sviatoslav Shevchuk[6].

The representative of the Protestants prayed for Ukraine to be able to get the leader that would be able to save her, while Ukrainian Muslims’ leader had a longer speech: “Today is the time when our leaders need courage. We have assumed the responsibility to provide courage to political leaders. Yesterday I had a meeting with Vitali Klichko, we will meet with the representatives of top universities, with other activists. We want our leaders to be unshakable, because it is inadmissible to continue to stall. We can say to the Power that no one will meet its “shameful” orders. The authority of the Church is much larger than that of politicians. May God and Allah help us. So all of us we will win”[7].

The presence of religious leaders on the Maidan stage is a powerful call to action. This religious solidarity provides revolutionary forces with the coveted justification of the actions undertaken against the forces of order. Just as well-justified is the occupation of administrative buildings both in Kiev and in other regions of the country, forcing regional officials to resign under the pressure of the crowd. Revolutionaries’ actions are more determined in the Western regions of the country, where clerical support for the demonstrators is even stronger. Representatives of the Greek Catholic Church in these regions are almost unanimously on the side of rebellious crowds.

If the demonstrators’ actions are directed towards the justification of continuing protests by attracting on their side several Ukrainian authoritative organizations, policy makers need less this ideological weapon. They have administrative tools. Ukrainian authorities threatened that they would put an end to the activities of the Greek Catholic Church, accusing the priests of being located along with the pro-European protesters in the centre of Kiev and arousing thereby the wrath of the faithful. A letter from the Ministry of Culture arrived, in which the representatives of the Greek Catholic clergy were accused of “having broken the law” by offering religious services outside of places of worship. This was immediately followed by numerous accusations addressed to the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, incriminated by the opposition that he was behind this letter. The fact is that although it was banned during the Soviet era, today the Greek-Catholic Church is the third largest religion in Ukraine, claiming 5.5 million parishioners in a country with a population of 46 million people, as well as 1.5 million believers in the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe, the United States and Australia[8].

The solidarity of which Ukraine this denomination’s representatives have manifested confirms the hypothesis that the events are based on an essentially revolutionary script, in which one can speak of a truly popular movement, and not about a simulated revolution in terms of control exercised by some non-systemic opposition leaders on several hundred violent demonstrators. Among the protesters there are numerous persons with appropriate behaviour and eager to continue the protests if not in an eminently civilized and peaceful manner, at least without casualties and without actions which endanger the very existence of the Ukrainian State.

3.   EXTERNAL PRESSURES

The events in Ukraine have major implications on the international environment and have revealed many aspects of the traditional conflict between the West and Moscow. As a result of starting hostilities in the Ukrainian capital, each side has mobilized human and material resources to achieve strategic advantages in this confrontation of major geopolitical interests, carried out over a number of decades and described by two distinguished authors, Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. The Revolution itself seems to be one of the manifestations of the confrontation between two of the world’s power centres. According to Mackinder, maritime powers are vying for securing the control of the “Heartland” (which has an impressive economic potential), while Russia is trying to expand her influence over the sea areas. In case one party will seize the area for which they are fighting, it will come to a rupture of the world power balance. At the same time, Mackinder argues that he who will end up by controlling the “Heartland” will dominate the world[9].

Halford Mackinder’s theory, according to which the world would be an unstable equilibrium between the continental interior and exterior maritime powers, provides us with an explanation for the recent events and presents Ukraine as a country crippled by powerful political and ideological cleavages. While the West shows vigorous sympathies for the Western vector, traditionally the East feels strongly attached to Byzantine political values. The only difference is the methodology applied by each of the two sides involved in the conflict.

The Ukrainian crisis aggravates the tensions existing between policy makers in Moscow and senior European officials, many of whom have visited Kiev and announced unconditional support for the Ukrainian opposition. We are referring to “great names” of the European establishment. The Maidan Square was visited by the European Council President, Herman Van Rompuy, and by the European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso. The head of European diplomacy, Catherine Ashton, has also gone to Ukraine. The other side is Russia, with a methodology different from that of the Europeans. Moscow prefers to come with financial pressures. For the Kremlin’s leader, Ukraine has made the choice in late November 2013, preferring to accept from Russia a credit of 15 billion dollars instead of a long-term political and trade agreement promoted by Brussels. The Europeans seem to try to take advantage of the difficult situation in Ukraine, as well as of the weakening of the Ukrainian President’s positions for the purpose of winning back the strategic advantage to Moscow’s detriment. The message has been sent to Kiev by EU Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Fule: either Yanukovych manages to reach a compromise with the opposition that has reinforced its position or the contesting-repression spiral continues, and may attract penalties upon the regime from the EU. He even evoked the idea of early parliamentary and presidential elections entailing the removal from power of the current Ukrainian President, a process that in the vision of the continent is democratic and allows the accession of an acceptable power in Kiev[10].

An important component of this confrontation of interests is the political and financial one, being applied in various methods of pressure to the Ukrainian establishment and sometimes by formulating extremely cogent arguments as to the situation in that country. An additional component of the conflict could be the one related to information. First of all, the fight is for the conquest of souls; in other words, in order to influence the behaviour and the vector you will accept Ukraine. Obviously, in this serious confrontation most tools are applied at the level of the mass media.

We should be aware of the fact that against the power of Kiev is directed the West’s media machine. Through world class companies, whose goal is the conquest of the planet (NBC, CNN, Fox News)[11], topics such as “murder”, “demonstrators assaulting journalists”, “persecution of opposition members”, “protestors kidnapping”, etc. can be indefinitely publicized Many of these subjects are sometimes intentionally sold in the information environment, causing among news consumers feelings favourable to the idea of war with “the big bully of the Orient”.

In their turn, Russian newspapers abound in news and critical commentaries as regards the Ukrainian opposition, speaking about “the serious interference” of Europeans in the internal affairs of Ukraine. Mainly the incidents with the forces of order are publicized, who are later victimized in front of a crowd which appears to be out of control.

If we are to explain the occurrence of this information and its intentional change according to certain civilization and geostrategic criteria, it remains to clarify the context in which they were being expanded, taken from other publications. And here it is of help the hypothesis developed by Alexis de Tocqueville, according to whom humans have the ability and tendency to mimic fear, and not to remain isolated and to be in tune with the public opinion[12].

In a country like Russia it can sometimes be very difficult to turn against the regime or against a majority of one’s fellow citizens. It ends up by influencing the media consumer’s behaviour in this country therefore eventually the tough position of the Kremlin leadership can be justified. There is also a constant search for an external enemy, as well as in the West, so at the level of mass media, there is an exaggerated hysteria against Russia and her foreign policy.

In analysing this confrontation of interests, the information gaps theory can be successfully applied, developed by American researchers from the University of Minnesota, according to which increasing the amount of information can have the effect of accentuating the differences in pre-existing knowledge. Depending on the civilization model that influenced his/her life and value system, each consumer and producer interprets specific news information in his/her own way, having a tendency to disregard that information and interpretation which run counter to his/her convictions.

If a person like Arnold Schwarzenegger, with so much visibility and authority worldwide, says he supports the Ukrainian people, making allusions concerning the opposition, media consumers tend to gravitate more and more around these opinions shared by successful people, but without involvement and activity undertaken systematically by the foreign policy of some Western countries. On the other hand, the presence of some persons as well as Kiev’s republican Senator John McCain or the Polish President’s brother, who died in an air crash in Russia, Yaroslaw Kaczinsky, seems to bring even more heat. It is obvious that the presence of these characters among the protesters is as if pouring gasoline on the fire of radical protesters.

4.   MORE BLOOD AND LESS DIALOGUE

Indeed, we are witnessing now a revival of the radical segment of the revolutionary movement, the segment that increases the authorities’ inquietude in the event of a confrontation at the country level, which may create precedents for triggering a civil war. Even more impressive, an important segment of the demonstrators detaches from the association with the EU and increasingly speaks of a national revolution. While the power and the opposition are seeking in vain a compromise solution and are not able to conclude a political agreement with a view to halting the tensions, the street enters the action through its most radical demonstrators, more specifically the members of the movement "Правый Сектор" (“the right”). They took the initiative and assumed full responsibility for the revolution. Just as important as the actions of the demonstrators in the street is their participation in the discussions and the spread of the revolutionary messages through social networks, including Russian ones. The number of members of such networks is skyrocketing, as more and more manifest the revolutionary spirit of those who do not want a peaceful change of power and are, to a greater or lesser extent, blood-thirsty. There are more political organizations that joined their efforts in the Right sector. Trizub, UNA-UNSO, Patriots of Ukraine, Belâi Molot and other movements and patriotic groups in the country are on the positions and mobilize combat units very well organized against the forces of order[13].

Besides the excessive populism of the demonstrators, their revolutionary attitude, namely Ukraine’s totalitarian history, the political-ideological cleavage that divided the country into two over the past two decades best explains the discontent of the population with the power and passivity of the Kiev authorities in dealing with issues related to economics, human rights, European integration. Although Stalinist repression was gradually replaced with a milder form of domination, which opened during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev to reform the prospects for political and economic system of the Soviet Union, the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the Soviet authorities towards the average citizen could never compare with those of leading Western style. Hence the enormous distance between a Western development model, in which the individual is the priority of State institutions, and a corrupt system, not revolutionized in terms of reforms and democratization processes, without shock therapies.

Precisely because of all that, a large part of the population of Ukraine preferred to opt for the European vector. In this way, the political criterion of integration presupposes the existence of stable democratic and functional institutions (legislative, executive, judiciary), but also the exercise of human rights. In achieving the objectives set in the action plan, the focus is mostly on the rights and freedoms enjoyed by the individual. The basic hypothesis is that without free and happy individuals the State cannot fully meet the requirements of Community institutions with respect to rights, even if the state of the economy as a whole is good.

The inability of the State to ensure the security of the individual, especially amid these revolutionary events, can be intensely publicized and even used to certain political goals. It is the so called “titushki” – a new word entered the lexicon of the Ukrainian language and with which everyone is familiar amid the revolutionary events in Ukraine. This name is given to strong and resistant young people, purportedly State employees who receive money to cause trouble at public gatherings and get involved in various illegal actions. These groups of violent youths are working under police protection or with the tacit agreement of the forces of order[14].

And in the case of the Maidan these young people represent an impressive force that can be used by the authorities to deprive the opposition of legitimacy. Not accidentally Russian channels make public and broadcast everything that happens in connection with these “titushki”, especially their clashes with security forces. The EU condemns the excessive violence exercised by the security forces in Ukraine, Berkut Police and hooligans groups about which there are accusations that might be supported by the Government, against the Euro-Maidan protesters. They asked Ukrainian authorities to investigate and punish those who committed acts of violence, citing the case of the leader of the protesters, Dmytro Bulatov[15], disappeared in January 22, abandoned in a forest near Kiev, after having been confined in an unknown place and tortured for over a week. Obviously, nor did the opposition miss any opportunity to take advantage of this event, so that the UDAR party leader, Vitali Klitschko, visited him at the hospital and denounced the acts of intimidation perpetrated against political opponents. On the day of the disappearance of Dmytro Bulatov, a corpse was found in a forest, with traces of torture. It was Iuri Verbitski’s, a militant disappeared a few days before the kidnapping of Bulatov[16].

Despite the violent clashes with the forces of order, the majority of the protesters is a segment that insists on the peaceful political change of the country. Perhaps that is why President Viktor Yanukovych agreed to talk with the opposition and even offered them jobs in the Government in exchange for ending the protests. The legitimacy of these opposition leaders rests however on the idea of continuing the protests until the final political change is accomplished. Yet if they accept new positions, they are likely to lose the support of the Maidan. It is precisely this juncture that is keeping revolutionary populism among the protesters’ movement at very high rates.

5.   INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

There are many similarities between the 2004 Orange Revolution and the current revolutionary events. A common element would consist in populism which, in conjunction with other factors, is impossible for the transformation of Ukraine and solving problems faced in a short term or at least medium. That’s why highlighting the hypothesis according to which the revolutionary enthusiasm will be consumed within a few months of government is an idealistic vision of “controlled revival of Ukraine”, “Ukrainian people’s immediate return to the great European family”, “punishment and final removal of the pro-Russian oligarchs”, etc. Because if even in the bosom of the protest movement conflicts have emerged which might lead to its division into several interest groups, many of the problems and wishes of ordinary Ukrainians will not find a solution.

Acts of protest and populism of revolutionary leaders (sometimes exaggerated promises thereof) must be replaced with civilized meetings with political opponents in order to find a compromise and define the proper management of State resources for the benefit of the citizen. It is extremely important, in the present context, the legitimacy of the new team in the eyes of the voters. Although there is rather a relationship of adversity between the Western interpretation of the position of the leaders of opinion in Russia against the Ukrainian people’s situation, that there should be two separate Ukraine, any politician in Kiev should not launch more arguments in favour of Moscow or Brussels. Ukraine’s interest should be thought of primarily in line with the preferences and desires of the citizens of this country, a situation which was only partially due to the lack of a real compromise between the political forces in Kiev.

           

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TEODORESCU, Bogdan, Dan SULTĂNESCU, Petru  BERTEANU, Diana CIURCIU-SULTĂNESCU, Arthur SUCIU, Leonard SULTĂNESCU, Andrei ŞIREPCO, Revoluţia portocalie în România, Editura Fundaţiei PRO, Bucureşti, 2006.

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MAKAREVICI, Oleg, “Liderii opozitiei raporteaza controversat datorita noii Constitutii”, Vesti.ua, 6.02.2014, [http://vesti.ua/politika/36283-v-oppozicii-nametilsja-raskol-na-fone-konstitucii].

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VIDU, Valentin, “Kievul avertizează Biserica Greco-Catolică, activă în cursul mişcării de contestare proeuropene”, Mediafax, 14.01.2014, [http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/kievul-avertizeaza-biserica-greco-catolica-activa-in-cursul-miscarii-de-contestare-proeuropene-11899383].

 

 



[1] Sanylo YANEVSKYI, The Face of Orange Revolution, Falio, Charkiv, 2005, pp. 77-78.

[2] Mark ADOMANIS, Everyone Needs to Remember That Ukraine Is Not a “Prize” But an Enormous Liability, Forbes.com, 13.12.2013, [http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/12/13/everyone-needs-to-remember-that-ukraine-is-not-a-prize-but-an-enormous-liability/].

[3] Bogdan TEODORESCU, Dan SULTĂNESCU, Petru BERTEANU, Diana CIURCIU-SULTĂNESCU, Arthur SUCIU, Leonard SULTĂNESCU, Andrei ŞIREPCO, Revoluția portocalie în România, Editura Fundația PRO, București, 2006, pp. 393.

[4]Ibidem, pp. 406.

[5]Макаричев ОЛЕГ, “Оппозиционеры рапортуют наперекор друг другу из-за новой Конституции”, Vesti.ua, 6.02.2014, [http://vesti.ua/politika/36283-v-oppozicii-nametilsja-raskol-na-fone-konstitucii].

[6] “Религиозные лидеры Украины продолжают призывать к мирному выходу из политического кризиса”, Religion.ua, 24.01.2014, [http://www.religion.in.ua/news/vazhlivo/24650-religioznye-lidery-ukrainy-prodolzhayut-prizyvat-k-mirnomu-vyxodu-iz-politicheskogo-krizisa.html].

[7]“Духовенство Майдана отказывается выполнять приказы власти”, Risu.org, 23.01.2014, [http://risu.org.ua/ru/index/exclusive/reportage/55058/].                                                                                                                                                                                                               

[8] Valentin VIDU, “Kievul avertizează Biserica Greco-Catolică, activă în cursul mişcării de contestare proeuropene”, Mediafax, 14.01.2014, [http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/kievul-avertizeaza-biserica-greco-catolica-activa-in-cursul-miscarii-de-contestare-proeuropene-11899383].

[9] Sergiu TĂMAŞ, Geopolitica. O abordare prospectivă, Noua Alternativă, Bucureşti, 1995, pp. 75-76.

[10] D.G., Criza ucraineană accentuează tensiunile dintre președintele rus Vladimir Putin și înalții oficiali europeni, reuniți pentru SUMMITUL RUSIA-UE, Revista 22, 28.01.2014, [http://www.revista22.ro/criza-ucraineana-accentueaza-tensiunile-dintre-pre537edintele-rus-vladimir-putin-537i-nal539ii-oficiali-europeni-reuniti-pentru-summitul-rusiaue-37173.html].

[11] Ignacio RAMONET, Geopolitica haosului, trans. Banu Matilda, Doina, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 142.

[12] Elizabeth NOELLE-NEUMANN, Spirala tăcerii. Opinia publică – învelişul nostru social, trans. Cucu-Oancea Vlad, Editura Comunicare.ro, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 61.

[13] “’Правый сектор’ взял на себя ответственность за ‘революцию’ в стране”, NovostiMK, 28.01.2014, [http://novosti-n.mk.ua/ukraine_article/read/7290.html].

[14] Lesia MAZANIK, “The Titushki Generation”, Sean’s Russia Blog, 01.02.2014, [http://seansrussiablog.org/2014/02/02/titushki-generation/]. 

[15] “Vinovaţii de uciderea protestatarilor din Ucraina, interdicţie în UE?”, Curierul Național, [http://ro.rsspress.info/article/61624bb7eb0ce96d611f7b27131b0514/Eveniment+-+vinovatii+de+uciderea+protestatarilor+din+ucraina,+interdictie+in+ue%3F+.html].

[16] “Un militant ucrainean a fost torturat și aruncat într-o pădure: M-au crucificat, mi-au tăiat o ureche, mi-au crestat fața. După accent, păreau ruși, Hotnews.ro, 31.01.2014, [http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-16518680-militant-ucrainean-fost-torturat-aruncat-intr-padure-crucificat-taiat-ureche-crestat-fata-dupa-accent-pareau-rusi.htm].