Social grievances, popular music and electoral mobilization in Romania[1]

Dragoş DRAGOMAN, Sabina-Adina LUCA, Bogdan GHEORGHIŢĂ

Department of Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies

 “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu

Abstract: The general social environment in Romania, as unraveled by the study of a widespread popular music genre called ‘manele’, is dominated by distrust, apathy and disengagement. In part, this is a response to the low political performance of political elites, largely seen as irresponsible and corrupt. By exploiting social and political grievances through the use of such a type of popular music, populist parties in Romania managed to electorally mobilize young people which have not been mobilized before. Although this can be seen as a democratic gain, hate speech and political violence can seriously undermine social and political trust and may prepare the ground for more radical action. 

Keywords: popular culture, populism, electoral participation, political violence, post-communism, Romania. 

Populism has recently become one of the most common features in Central and Eastern Europe.[i] In many countries in the region, populist parties are electorally successful and even manage to form the government.[ii] Now, when the European Union conditionality is no longer in place, a general backsliding is to be noticed in the region,[iii] marking the end of the post-communist transition paradigm, defined by a general consensus regarding the constitutional order that safeguards political and civil rights and the effort for economic liberalism.[iv] The aim of this article is to shed light on the favorable preconditions and on the strategies that Romanian populists, namely the populist Democrat Liberal party (PDL) and the Romanian president Traian Băsescu (2004-2014), used during the 2008 and 2009 electoral campaigns. They are labeled as populists because, due to their shared values, motivations, discourses and actions,[v] but also because they are perceived as such by number of journalists and academics.[vi]  By exploiting political and social grievances, they managed to stir and channel a pre-existing discontent and to turn it into electoral advantage. Their capacity to use social grievances was doubled by the ability to reach specific electoral targets, especially those targets inaccessible to political competitors. One of these particular targets, the undereducated young people that can hardly be mobilized by regular parties, was reached through a strategy that brought in the use of popular music during populists’ electoral campaigns. The genre used by populists is the most widespread and most highly valued among undereducated young people, a music genre called ‘manele’ that one can notice everywhere in Romania, in restaurants, railway stations, buses or taxis.

As an accurate expression of this group’s social and political knowledge and orientations, ‘manele’ generally emphasize social distrust, disengagement, powerless feelings against the public space and its political expressions.[vii] In ‘manele’s gloomy view of the social reality, the public/political space is elusive, remote, hostile, subject to manipulation by distant forces and impossible to change by ordinary citizens. Populists’ strategy actually largely emphasized the new hero, the populist leader himself, who fights against those manipulating distant forces and re-empowers the ordinary citizens. This communication strategy proved to be successful and helped mobilize many disengaged and apathetic undereducated young people, offering the electoral advantage needed to set the populist party as the most important party in parliament. Yet by emphasizing the generalized distrustful environment in Romanian society, by using political and social hatred, populists may undermine citizens’ future willingness to cooperate and engage in the public democratic sphere and prepare the ground for more radical political action.

1.       YOUNG PEOPLE AND POLITICAL APATHY

The widespread popular disengagement from political life has become a common feature of post-communist societies. Despite the overwhelming popular enthusiasm back in 1989, citizens in the region seem to have renounced their democratic role. Once democracy established, they turned back to their private lives and abandoned the public space at the mercy of political elites. On the other hand, citizens in the region don’t trust politicians and political parties.[viii] They are not eager to vote and there is no difference when it comes to taking into account different levels of electoral competition. The turnout rates are seemingly low in local, parliamentary or presidential elections. Moreover, voting is used as a sanction for the incumbents’ poor performance, especially for unemployment,[ix] rather than a permanent control tool of elected officials. Political participation, other than voting, is generally low in the region, and especially lower when compared to West European features. East-Europeans are less active when it comes to signing a petition, gathering for a political manifestation or overtly protesting against an unfair decision. Civic activism is seemingly low.[x] The low level of political and civic participation, combined with the vote sanction, may have an undermining impact on the democratic practices and institutions, on the electoral volatility, the stability of party systems and on the accountability of elected representatives.[xi]

The explanation for the weakness of post-communist civil society may be found in the very nature of the previous communist regime,[xii] but also and in the nature of the post-communist transition itself, especially regarding democratic protest. Early negotiated settlements between elites that led to the creation of democratic systems, the cooptation of some of the leaders of opposition movements into government and the economic transition, all have caused the demobilization of the civil society.[xiii] They only added to the previous communist regime social atomization and distrust, weak ties and political apathy.[xiv] In democratic settings, people participate in politics because they can, because they want or because they were asked to.[xv] That means that participation has to be seen as depending upon resources (time, money and skills needed for political participation), motivations (interest for politics, clear preferences for peculiar policies, expected gratifications that arise from political activity) and recruitment.

When one notices that political participation is lower among youngsters, he has thus to take into account those resources, motivations and recruitment patterns, combined into contextual and cultural factors. During the transition period, young people seem to have been most affected by social shock in terms of resources.[xvi] They now face new challenges in the context of marketization, democratization and increased labor migration.[xvii] In Romania, statistical and survey data indicate that age, household income and education are important factors for political participation, combining conventional forms of participation like voting, and new, unconventional forms, such as protest.[xviii] Moreover, young people avoid political participation because of lack of motivation. The general low trust in the political system turns political participation into a useless action for those who have no hope to influence political institutions and politicians. These institutions are generally seen as rigged against ordinary men and women and run by corrupt and irresponsible officials. Thus young people feel politically powerless and disregard public issues. Additionally, they reject any kind of mobilization that reminds them about the previous communist forced political mobilization.[xix] On the other hand, young people who desire to get involved in more significant political action don’t always have the right connections for successful political activity. Often seen in Eastern Europe as vehicles for personal welfare,[xx] parties in power are not accessible to everyone. Post-communist parties benefit, as other inchoate institutions, of a wide range of former social (in fact, personal) networks that are specific to atomized societies which make more formal civil society organizations unattractive for many people.[xxi] The persistence of personal networks is a response to the organizational failure and to the corruption of formal organizations. Networks that individuals can invoke in response are anti-modern: forms of informal, diffuse social cooperation; begging or cajoling public officials; using connections to ‘bend’ rules or paying bribes that break rules.[xxii] The uneasy access to public offices only adds to the general powerless feeling and the distrustful social environment.

Yet young people’s political apathy is not at all an East European feature. Following the profound and unprecedented social and economic transformations in the ’60s and ’70s, the repertories of political action in Western Europe changed dramatically, while political activity generally turned into more unconventional forms.[xxiii] In the previous industrial period, with social structure and with growing alternatives in ideologies, political parties and movements, people have developed loyalties (to these ideologies, parties and movements) in order to acquire guidance in how to think and act politically. According to Barnes,[xxiv] a new type of mobilization emerged and replaced the previous political mobilization in accordance with the ongoing changes in the range of dominant values.[xxv] The emerging age is one of cognitive mobilization. Although many people remain tied to the political system in the older social and political patterns of adherence, in the age of generalized education and mass communication there is less need to turn to parties for guidance on public policy. Now people are free to choose among a vast range of causes, civil society associations and solicitations and they do so in terms of personal interests and passions.[xxvi]

Thus it is not clear whether young people can be seen as either disengaged, disenfranchised, heralds of an incipient crisis of democracy, or active and engaged in sophisticated new forms of politics.[xxvii] In post-communist societies, they can be seen as either distrustful and disengaged citizens, disconnected from the flow of political communication and generally feeling powerless and pessimistic about their influence over the political system, or fully capable of mobilizing in regime change processes, as they did during the Orange revolutions.[xxviii] No matter if they are seen as valuable assets for democracy or potentially harmful contesters that could undermine authoritarian political regimes and that have to be severely contained,[xxix] young people are social forces that count. And they seem to count more and more, since their social and political values and orientations are critical for the future. In fact, due to acute changes in childhood conditions in post-modern societies, even young children are to be taken into account.[xxx] In Romania, they have been seriously taken into account by populists when evaluating the electoral context. With the professionalization of electoral campaigning, populists made an important attempt to mobilize young people by the use of popular music, ingeniously exploiting the recurrent social themes that are carried out by this type of music.

2.       BACKGROUND

            The use of ‘manele’ as electoral vehicles indicates a deep change in Romanian politics. On the one hand, it accompanies the political raise of populism and emphasizes on the political function of the populist leader as expressing the very voice of the ‘people’. In this terms, ‘people’ equals the broad category of ordinary citizens that tend to exclude other categories from this definition, namely different social, sexual, ethnic and racial groups, as well as social and political elites. On the other hand, it clearly indicates a professionalization of political campaigning in selecting and insulating peculiar electoral targets that parties tend to electorally mobilize. The 2008 parliamentary elections and the 2009 presidential elections that helped Romanian populists to consolidate in power cannot be fully understood without taking into account the 2007 split between classical moderate liberals from the National Liberal Party and the populist Democrat Liberal Party. Though back in 2004 they have succeeded together to defeat the ruling Social-Democrat Party (PSD) in parliament and to the presidency by largely using an overtly populist rhetoric against pervasive corruption, essential differences between the PNL prime-minister Tăriceanu and the Romanian president (formerly PDL leader) Traian Băsescu led to an unsolved conflict that culminated with the impeachment of the president Băsescu in 2007 by the new PNL-PSD majority in parliament.[xxxi] Though the president was put back in office by the will of the majority of citizens expressed by referendum, his relationship with the parliament will never be the same. In fact, 2007 and the failed referendum for impeaching the president is the defining moment of victorious populism. The subsequent electoral campaigns won by the populists originate in the 2007 populist attack against power elites in parliament, the judiciary system and the hostile mass-media, when populists succeeded in mobilizing enough supporters to overrule Parliament’s decision to impeach the president. As shown below, the popular music proved to be a solution in order to exploit political grievances and mobilize otherwise disengaged citizens.

3.       ‘MANELE’ AND DOMINANT SOCIAL VALUES

As an essential social product, popular culture offers compelling insights into the social world we live in. Unlike the so-called high culture, popular culture based on experiences and views of the common folk may more accurately unravel the very fabric of the social world. In the same time, popular music is an essential vehicle for various cultural images and symbols and therefore can be used in the political communication. In fact, it can act as any other vehicle carrying images and symbols in order to generate a particular narrative.[xxxii] Popular music may also serve as vehicle for frustration, anger and protest against established values and norms.[xxxiii] As social sign, music may appeal to the emotions of a generation, particularly a young generation. That is why music is probably the most suitable way for young people to express not only their identity, but their political knowledge and orientations.[xxxiv]

The songs we take into account in this research are called ‘manele’ (singular: ‘manea’). Though there are also classical ‘manele’, in fact Turkish derived genre of dance music performed as early as the 18^th century by Romani musicians in pre-modern Romania, the modern manele we take into account are a mixture of Romani music with Turkish, Greek and even Indian elements, combined using modern (especially electronic) instruments and beats. In fact, the mixture of music genres and the eclectic beats makes ‘manele’ to be related to other music styles in the Balkans, like Bulgarian ‘chalga’, Greek modern ‘laiko’, Turkish ‘arabesque’ and to a lesser extent to Serbian ‘turbo-folk’. This mixture makes ‘manele’ relatively hard to clearly define, yet there can be seen as a mixture of complex local Romani and oriental Balkan, Turkish and Arabic influences over a pop tune.

‘Manele’ are widespread cultural items in Romania, especially among young people since the beginning of the post-communist transition in 1990. They seem to enjoy ‘manele’ the most, according to several surveys. In fact, a survey requested in 2005 by the National Audio-Visual Council, the regulating body for audio-visual media in Romania, unraveled that almost a third of youngsters between 11 and 14 years of age and more than a fifth of those between 15 and 18 years old mostly enjoyed ‘manele’.[xxxv] Back in 2004, a Gallup / British Council survey indicated that 20 % of those between 15 and 35 years old were enjoying ‘manele’.[xxxvi] Young people in Romania use to listen to them in various daily contexts, on a Sunday barbecue or while driving their cars. They are so popular among them that media entrepreneurs in Romania, acknowledging their market potential, now offer not only numerous special internet web sites, but radio stations (Taraf FM)  and even TV channels (Taraf TV, Mynele TV).

Though ‘manele’ are often labeled by intellectuals as pseudo-music, bad taste or pure kitsch, they could be seen as potential vehicle for the expression of a specific counterculture. This is also the case of rap music, who managed to largely increase the popularity of African-American youth styles among young people from various parts of the world as to become one of the most esteemed youth culture on the globe.[xxxvii] As vehicle for symbols and images, rap music has helped in defining black identity in the context of modernity.[xxxviii] In Romania, ‘manele’ helped young people sharing new ways of expressing their individuality trough this special kind of music, forged into a vivid counterculture by the interaction between many cultures, urban subcultures and new technology opportunities.[xxxix] From this perspective, ‘manele’ may express underground identity concerns, as well as social or more personal themes as justice, equality, corruption, power and domination, fate and predestination, in opposition to the official discourse on Romania’s modernization and Europeanization. In this vein, they were acknowledged for their communication potential and seriously taken into account as valuable electoral vehicle in order to mobilize young people.

Though ‘manele’ are not exclusively related to a social category, being enjoyed by large shares of the young public, they were especially used by populists in order to reach electoral segments difficult to mobilize by other parties. Whereas young people tend generally to be difficult to politically mobilize, its undereducated segment is even more difficult to mobilize through classical means. Though ‘manele’ are criticized by intellectuals for their banality, consumerism and sexualized aesthetics, these critics come from academic and cultural standpoints and relate to the public perception of ‘mane’ public taken as an undereducated. This is also the case of Serbian and Croatian ‘turbofolk’, criticized as an aesthetic said to reproduce dominant social values as quick enrichment, conspicuous consumption, masculinity realized through violence, and femininity realized through sexual availability.[xl] In the same time, ‘manele’ seem to be related to certain marginality in terms of social status, though the correlation is not very powerful. Using the data of a survey on cultural consumption,[xli] Brumaru finds out that ‘manele’ are a different kind of music when compared to other music styles in terms of public.[xlii] In fact, those who listen to ‘manele’ are different from those who listen to other music styles and most related to those who enjoy hip-hop and house music. When he takes into account all music styles in factor analysis, Brumaru unravels a four factor model that includes ‘manele’ in a factor alongside religious and classical symphonic music. ‘Manele’ have the largest loading in that factor and correlates negatively to the other music styles, meaning a great opposition between ‘manele’ and the other music genres. Yet the most important findings relate to the correlations between ‘manele’ consumption and significant social factors. Thus ‘manele’ are clearly related to young people, and especially to undereducated young people both in terms of formal education attendance and knowledge score (computed by the author). The same is true regarding the correlation between ‘manele’ consumption and the subjective occupational status, income and rural/urban residence, those who listen to ‘manele’ having a lower social status and being located in peri-urban and rural areas. This might explain the concern of populists to use the most suitable communication strategy for mobilizing undereducated young people and turn social and political grievances into electoral advantage.

4.       DATA

As underlined earlier, ‘manele’ are highly popular music items in Romania. One can listen to them in taxis and railway stations, restaurants and buses, but they can be very easily found on special radio and TV music channels or downloaded from special internet websites. The ‘manele’ corpus we used for our content analysis, in fact more than two thousand, was selected from several music top charts on the internet.[xliii] A number of 31 ‘manele’ have been selected using several tag words that pertain to social issues (as ‘friends’, ‘enemies’, ‘cruel world’ etc.) and candidates. Through content analysis,[xliv] we first analyzed the dominant social concepts and norms, in order to subsequently unravel their relationship with specific political issues and candidates. Regarding candidates however, the only candidates that have benefited of ‘manele’ in the 2008 and 2009 electoral campaigns taken here into account were populists. The incumbent president Băsescu and the populist PDL are the political actors that figure in ‘manele’ texts, the former being depicted as a popular hero very close to the ‘manele’ ordinary  hero that strives to survive in the harsh social environment.

5.       DISTRUST, SOCIAL UNCERTAINTY AND THE ‘MEAN WORLD’

The dominant values expressed by ‘manele’ largely helped populists to mould their campaign rhetoric when addressing to young people. The social environment depicted by ‘manele’ singers is a gloomy one. Thus they sing about the drama of the hero (most often the ‘manele’ singer himself) confronting the ‘mean world’. The ‘mean world’ is seen as a collective, harmful, remote and powerful enemy that overwhelms single individuals. It is actually generated by the dichotomy friends/foes. By its mean, the individual is conceived as permanently fighting in order to survive the harsh social environment. Its enemies are generally powered by pure hatred against him and that feeling is mainly triggered by envy. They are imagined as covetous with regard to one’s success, possessions and advantages, and odiously plotting against him. By contrast, manele’s hero, the one that makes the assertions in the ‘manele’ texts, generally portrays himself as ‘cooler’, cleverer, richer, more hard working and better fit to overpass life’s difficulties. He is shown in the video clips expensing large sums of money and driving new and expensive cars, often accompanied by good looking young ladies dressed in imitating luxury clothing brands.

Yet the social environment is uncertain. On the one hand, its foundations are purely material. The most emphasized issue in ‘manele’ is money and every single stereotype about money can be found here: they strengthen you in your social conflicts, they can buy you a privileged social status, and they offer you power and pleasure. In the ever shifting social environment, the worse social decay the ‘manele’ singer wishes to its enemies is to see them fall into a condition when they cannot enjoy anymore their money, their cars, when they are abandoned by everybody, sold out and literally starving. On the other hand, the distinction between friends and foes is not always easy to make. This uncertainty adds new significance to the ‘mean world’. Close friends, often called ‘brothers’, prove sometimes to be ungrateful, despite the efforts one makes in order to support and comfort them. This discontent often turns into frustration and bitterness in the ‘manele’, when the ‘hero’ confesses his grief of finding out his close friends and allies to be its worse enemies. One should therefore be aware and feel a strong suspicion about close friends that attempt to coax, because they only might want to seduce and dupe. Those misleading friends are generally depicted in ‘manele’ as flattering in order to take advantage of one’s material goods or social status and finally maneuvering to despoil and discard him.

The social values emphasized by ‘manele’ are critical for a certain conception of the social environment. Their pessimistic view matches with the general conceptions regarding the public space as being elusive, remote, hostile, subject to manipulation by distant forces and impossible to change by ordinary citizens. It is not clear if ‘manele’ actually work like the much criticized television propensity for crime, war, disease and other plagues that makes viewers reasonably think that the real world is a terribly cruel and ‘mean world’. And it is a ‘mean world’ because people don’t trust each other and are looking out primarily for themselves.[xlv] By the social values they carry on, ‘manele’ could be a suitable indicator of low trust and disengaged social environment, as well as a relevant social factor by their influence among youngsters. This was exactly the opportunity seized by Romanian populists in order to mobilize generally undereducated and disengaged young people.

6.       ‘MANELE’, POLITICAL GRIEVANCES AND THE POPULIST HERO

            The political environment depicted by ‘manele’ does not differ so much from the social environment. In fact, political issues in ‘manele’ reproduce by and large the social context unraveled by our previous content analysis. While keeping the general framework of an uncertain, hostile and elusive social environment, the political ‘manele’ used by populists remove the social hero (most often the ‘manele’ singer himself) and replace him with the populist political hero. In the ‘manea’ written for the 2008-2009 campaigns, the incumbent president Băsescu is portrayed as the true ‘people’s’ hero.[xlvi] This assertion of certain popularity is based in the ‘manea’ on the first name of the president, which is Traian, emphasized in the text as a Latin name, echoing that of the Roman Emperor Trajan.[xlvii]

By supporting people’s interests, the populist hero is forced to experience once again the drama generally depicted by the ‘manele’. He is betrayed by his closest ally, namely by the prime-minister Tăriceanu, a rogue and ungrateful (former) ‘brother’ that has been seduced with large sums of money by president’s worse enemies. Those enemies are, in fact, peculiar to Romanian populist discourse, and they are number of interest groups. Since interest groups that allegedly attempt to control Romania are common place in the populists discourse, it is not surprising to find them pointed out in the ‘manele’ texts as president Băsescu’s bitter enemies. They have thus plotted against him and unfairly attacked him from behind (while impeaching him in 2007).

In fact, ‘manele’ managed to accurately depict the political environment in the very terms that were familiar to those listening that kind of music, while emphasizing on the general grievances expressed by ordinary Romanian citizens. Knowing that the Parliament benefits of very little support from ordinary citizens,[xlviii] populists managed to pinpoint it as the expression of a dishonest power elite rigged against ordinary people. Yet ‘manele’ strongly underlined a dimension that is inherent to populists’ discourse, namely the ultimate conflict with a terrible enemy. In their reductionist view, the institutional conflict from 2007 between democratic institutions, the parliament and the government, on the one hand, and the president, on the other hand, turned out to be a bitter conflict for political survival.[xlix] The impeachment of the president by the parliament with the support of 322 elected MPs was therefore presented (even by populist leaders themselves) as a war against 322 MPs and against the unlawful and irresponsible Parliament. Consequently, the president used his prerogatives and initiated a consultative referendum regarding both the reduction of the number of MPs to less than 300 and the transition from the current bicameralism to mono-cameralism in Romania. Because Romanians backed this initiative, the president now asks for a constitutional revision in Parliament that puts in place those changes. Any refusal or partial opposition from the MPs is to be once again labeled by populists as the very expression of the obsolete privileges that the parliament strives to keep against the will or ordinary people.

Labeling the Parliament as an illegitimate interest group rigged against ordinary people that has to be fought to death is, of course, a very effective political strategy put in place through ‘manele’. It is also true that this electoral strategy is an appropriate electoral response given by populist to existing political grievances. During transition from the communist rule, Parliament was the most unfamiliar democratic institution that Romanian citizens had to acknowledge as democratically essential. For two decades, the parliament was largely seen as inefficient while highly costly, inertial and ready to defend individual MPs against anti-corruption prosecutors and judges.[l] This is not surprising that the representation, the role and the functioning of political parties and the parliamentarian procedures are insignificant for those who prefer a strong leader who spends no time with parties and elections. They are generally young and under-educated people, who additionally display extremist, racist and xenophobic feelings and conservative values.[li] In fact, young and undereducated people are the most apathetic citizens, yet they can be mobilized by populists through appropriate channels and by appealing claims. ‘Manele’ actually worked as a very suitable way of mobilizing other people that the ordinary educated, middle-class voters from medium-size towns and big cities.[lii] They thus reached an important electoral target that has not been addressed by other parties, an electoral segment very sensitive to the issues of disempowerment, distrust and harsh social conflict. Through hate speech, revenge attitudes and violent menaces,[liii] the populist leader has become the hero of those socially disempowered and politically disenfranchised people in his bitter fight against people’s enemies. Mobilizing those people proved to be decisive for both overruling parliament’s impeachment in 2007 and for winning the second round of the presidential elections in 2009.

As underlined by Schmitter,[liv] populists seriously challenge democracy as they tend to pinpoint aliens and foreign powers as scapegoats for their own political failures. The latter issues may combine to set up the stage, critics claim,[lv] for more radical action. Thus undermining the legitimacy of democratic institution and practices may prepare the ground for extreme-right activists and their decisive attacks against different ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic or sexual groups that they exclude from the narrow definition of ‘people’ or of ‘nation’. Facing new political grievances based on racial prejudices, the populist hero may play the same game as populists do when it comes to refuse to publically acknowledge their own political failures. In this vein, populism in Romania recently proved that different ethnic groups can be the perfect scapegoats for political lack of success.[lvi] This is the case of the failure of Romania’s accession to the Schengen free movement agreement in Europe, when Roma people were blamed for pouching and begging in the Netherlands, France and Finland, the countries that actually opposed in September 2011 to Romania’s accession. Roma people have been largely accused by populists of having made a lot of trouble in those countries and undermined official diplomatic efforts.[lvii] Populism has thus triggered a chain reaction of extremist violence that swept the media for weeks. In fact, in this trouble context, populist hate speech strongly  emphasized by ‘manele’ against populists’ political enemies could easily change of target in stigmatizing whole categories of different social groups and even prepare the ground for more radical action.[lviii]

7.       CONCLUSION

The raise of populism in Romania cannot be fully understood without a clear analysis of social and political predispositions that have been turned into political resources by populists. Populism in Western and Eastern Europe is a mere response to social and political conditions. Whereas populist parties in Western Europe mainly emphasize on social and economic insecurity and immigration issues, populists in Eastern Europe seem to turn mainly against power elites allegedly rigged against ordinary people. Following the accession to the European Union and the end of the European democratic conditionality, populists in Central and Eastern Europe focused their attacks against liberal democracy institutions and practices.[lix] Looking for unshared and unbalanced power, populists undermine parliament’s legitimacy, fight against unfavorable court decisions and attack the freedom of critical mass-media and of other autonomous bodies like central banks or universities. In their struggle for power, they allegedly fight against pervasive corruption, state inefficiency and promote popular values. Thus they tend to mobilize previously apathetic and disenfranchised people, which is rather a symptom of democracy.[lx]

In the same time, the political style they promote could be harmful for democracy. In Romania, the mobilization of those apathetic citizens, most of them young and undereducated people, was realized by transferring the electoral issues into the mould of very popular songs called ‘manele’. In a way, ‘manele’ were the most suitable communication vehicles for populists in their attempt to reach specific demobilized electoral segments. Though it proved to be a winning strategy for populists in Romania, the use of ‘manele’ on an unprecedented scale also raises the question of political responsibility. This is mainly due to the dominant values carried out by this kind of very popular music. The social environment depicted by ‘manele’ is a very distrustful one, a ‘mean world’ where isolated individuals are meant to fight for survival. This is a world where no one can be trusted and where even one’s closest friends and allies may often prove to be rogue. This is a social space dominated by the will of power, measured by possessions, money and social position. As vehicles for symbols and images, ‘manele’ were the best way for expressing populist hero’s struggle for power, in fact his fight against his worse enemies, would they be individuals (counter-candidates, former allies or journalists) or institutions (the Parliament, the Government or the courts of justice).

Yet people mobilized into politics by hate speech, though now allegedly empowered by the populist leader’s victory, cannot learn and practice the lesson of democracy. Once the consensus regarding the very basis of liberal democracy is broken, i.e. the separation of powers, the existence of politically neutral institutions and the legal guarantees for various minority rights, the political force stirred up by mobilizing new social groups can turn against them. Or it can harm every single social group that populists tend to exclude from the narrow definition of ‘people’. Once the ground was prepared by populists’ struggle for power, using outcrying hate speech, different racial, ethnic, religious or sexual groups can be pinpointed as enemies and fought to death by extremists. Though it is not necessarily intended by populists, emotional politics can very easily interfere with prejudices and mobilize towards more radical action. Whereas they are the perfect scapegoats for covering up populists’ political failures, minority groups can become social and political targets for radical extremists.

Even without overtly radical action, such a social and political environment is no longer fit for democratic theory and practice. Hate, revenge and instrumental power are not the ingredients for trust, commitment, reciprocity and social cooperation. Though allegedly empowered by the populist leader, ordinary people cannot really use the power resource in order to engage into collective action and solve cooperation issues. This is another expectation raised by populists that cannot be fulfilled in democratic terms. Yet it could add in frustration, disillusion and despair and could lead to both profound mistrust and disengagement, and to overtly radical, authoritarian, massive and violent reshaping of the political system.[lxi] This is much more evident today, when PDL and Traian Băsescu are no longer the dominant political force.[lxii] Though many opponents of the populist overtly protested in January and February 2012 in the streets of numerous Romanian towns against the democratic setbacks promoted by PDL populists, the local elections campaign of June 2012 unraveled the consequence of populist rhetoric and political action. Despite the electoral losses for PDL, the most noticeable feature is the rise of a more radical populist party (People’s Party), run by a controversial leader and TV owner, Dan Diaconescu. Acknowledging the potential of visual media and learning the lesson of populist mobilization taught by PDL, he surprisingly managed to turn a minor party with virtually no ground base in terms of financing and territorial organization into a successful party and to almost topple PDL as the most important opposition party in Romania. People’s Party success is thus a warning for the misuse of populist mobilization, especially in a context marked by harsh economic difficulties and widespread social grievances. 

Bibliography

ADORNO, Theodor, The Philosophy of Modern Music, Seabury, New York, 1980.

ALEXANDRU, Violeta, Adrian MORARU, Loredana ERCUŞ, Declinul participării la vot în România, Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Bucharest, 2009.

ASH, Konstantin, “A game-theoretic model for protest in the context of post-communism”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2011.

ATWAL, Maya, “Evaluating Nashi’s Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 5, 2009.

BĂDESCU, Gabriel, Paul SUM, Eric M. USLANER, “Civil society development and democratic values in Romania and Moldova”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2004.

BAKER, Catherine, “Popular Music and Political Change in Post-Tudman Croatia: ‘It’s All the Same, Only He’s not Here?’”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 62, No. 10, 2010.

BAKER, Catherine, “The concept of turbofolk in Croatia: inclusion/exclusion in the construction of national music identity”, in C. BAKER, C.J. GERRY, B. MADAJ, L. MELISH, J. NAHODILOVA (eds.), Nation in formation: inclusion and exclusion in Central and Eastern Europe, SSEES Publications, London, 2007.

BARDIN, Laurence, “L’analyse du contenu,” in Serge MOSCOVICI, Fabrice BUSCHINI (eds.), Les méthodes des sciences humaines, PUF, Paris, 2003.

BARNES, Samuel H., “Perspectives on Political Action: A Review Twenty-five Years Later”, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, Sweden, 2004.

BARNES, Samuel H., Max KAASE et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, Sage, London, 1979.

BEREND, Ivan T., “Social shock in transforming Central and Eastern Europe”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2007.

BOZÓKI, András, “Consolidation or Second Revolution? The Emergence of the New Right in Hungary”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2008.

BRUMARU, Virgil, Stratificare socială şi preferinţe muzicale, unpublished manuscript, B.A. thesis, University of Bucharest, 2008.

BUGARIC, Bojan, “Populism, liberal democracy, and the rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2008.

COLLIER, David, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1979.

DE WAELE, Jean Michel, Anna PACZEŚNIAK (eds.), Populism in Europe – defect or symptom of democracy, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw, 2010.

DRAGOMAN, Dragoş, “Atitudini ale cetăţenilor faţă de democraţie şi instituţiile politice”, in Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Democratizare şi consolidare democratică în Europa Centrală şi de Est, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2014.

DRAGOMAN, Dragoş, “Populism, autoritarism şi valori democratice în opinia publică din România,” in Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010.

DRAGOMAN, Dragoş, “Post-Accession Backsliding: Non-ideological Populism and Democratic Setbacks in Romania”, South-East European Journal of Political Science, Vol. I, No. 3, 2013.

DRAGOMAN, Dragoş, “Tinerii, manelele şi spaţiul public. Valori sociale dominante şi mobilizare politică”, in Sabina-Adina LUCA (ed.), Tânăr în România. Noi valori, noi identităţi, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2013.

DRAGOMAN, Dragoş, “Trust and cooperation in the public sphere: Why Roma people should not be excluded?”, POLIS, Vol. II, No. 2, 2014.

DRAGOMAN, Dragoş, “Trust, reciprocity and volunteerism: Explaining low political activism in post-communist Romania”, Sociologie Românească, Vol. VII, No. 4, 2009.

EKE, Steven M., Taras KUZIO, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2000.

FARTHING, Rys, “The politics of youthful antipolitics: representing the ‘issue’ of youth participation in politics”, Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2010.

GHEORGHIŢĂ, Bogdan, Sabina-Adina LUCA, “Societatea românească între polarizare şi stratificare. O perspectivă după 19 ani de postcomunism”, Sociologie Românească, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 2010.

GHERGHINA, Sergiu, George JIGLĂU, “Who Votes for Populists in Central and Eastern Europe? A Comparative Perspective from Five EU Member States”, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, 2011.

GHERGHINA, Sergiu, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010.

GHERGHINA, Sergiu, Sergiu MISCOIU, “The Failure of Cohabitation: Explaining the 2007 and 2012 Institutional Crises in Romania”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2013.

GIBSON, James L., “Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia’s Democratic Transition,” in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Eric M. USLANER (eds.), Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, Routledge, New York, 2003.

GILROY, Paul, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1993.

GRØDELAND,  Ase B., “‘Red Mobs’, ‘Yuppies’, ‘Lamb Heads’ and Others: Contacts, Informal Networks and Politics in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2007.

HAHN, Jeffrey W., Igor LOGVINENKO, “Generational Differences in Russian Attitudes towards Democracy and the Economy”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 8, 2008.

HAVENS, Timothy, “Subtitling Rap: Appropriating The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air for Youthful Identity Formation in Kuwait”, International Communication Gazette, Vol. 63, No. 1, 2001.

HEMMENT, Julie, “Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and the Restructuring of Social Welfare in Russia”, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 56, No. 6, 2009.

HOWARD, Marc Morjé, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-communist Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

INGLEHART, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1977.

JASIEWICZ, Krzysztof, “The new populism in Poland: The usual suspects?”, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2008.

KRIPPENDORFF, Klaus, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1980.

KUZIO, Taras, “Civil socity, youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies,, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2006.

LEVITZ, Philip, Grigore POP-ELECHES, “Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2010.

MATEI, Sorin A., “From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Virtual Community Discourse and the Dilemma of Modernity”, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2005.

MATUSITZ, Jonathan, “Semiotics of Music: Analysis of Cui Jian’s ‘Nothing to My Name,’ the Anthem for the Chinese Youths in the Post-Cultural Revolution Era”, The Journal of Popular Culture, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2010.

MIROIU, Mihaela, “What is Left from Democracy? Electoralism and Populism in Romania”, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, 2011.

NORRIS, Pippa, “Young People and Political Activism: From the Politics of Loyalties to the Politics of Choice?”, Report for the Council of Europe Symposium “Young people and democratic institutions: from disillusionment to participation”, Strasbourg, France, 2003.

NORRIS, Pippa, Stefan WALGRAVE, Peter VAN AELST, “Who Demonstrates: Anti-State Rebels, or Conventional Participants? or Everyone?”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2005.

Ó BEACHÁIN, Donnacha, Abel POLESE, “‘Rocking the vote’: new forms of youth organisations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union”, Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2010.

O’TOOLE, Therese, “Engaging with Young People’s Conceptions of the Political,” Children’s Geographies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003.

PLATTNER, Marc F., “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010.

PRIZEL, Ilya, “Populism as a Political Force in Postcommunist Russia and Ukraine”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2000.

PUTNAM, Robert D., “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America”, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1995.

ROBERTS, Andrew, “Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe”, Electoral Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2008.

ROSE, Richard, “Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia,” World Bank Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 6, 1998. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-06.pdf

RUPNIK, Jan, “From democracy fatigue to populist backlash”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, no. 4, 2007.

SCHMITTER, Philippe, “A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of Populisms”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, pp. 5-11.

STRATTON, Jon, “Beyond Art: Postmodernism and the Case of Popular Music,” Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1989.

TWORZECKI, Hubert, “A disaffected new democracy? Identities, institutions and civic engagement in post-communist Poland”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2008.

USLANER, Eric M., “Social Capital, Television, and the ‘Mean World’: Trust, Optimism, and Civic Participation”, Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1998.

VALKOV, Nikolay, “Membership in voluntary organizations and democratic performance: East post-Communist countries in comparative perspective,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2009.

VAN DETH, Jan W., Simone ABENDSCHÖN, Meike VOLLMAR, “Children and Politics: An Empirical Reassessment of Early Political Socialization”, Political Psychology, Vol. 32, no. 1, 2011.

VERBA, Sidney, Key L. SHLOZMAN, Henry E. BRADY, “Rational action and political activity”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2000.

VÖLKER, Beate, Henk FLAP, “Weak ties as a liability: the case of East Germany”, Rationality and Society, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2001.

WHITE, Anne, “Young people and migration from contemporary Poland”, Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2010.

ZIELONKA, Jan, “The Quality of Democracy after Joining the European Union”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2007.