Coordinated by Aurelian GIUGĂL

 

 De-Democratization in a contentious space.

Cambodia after the 1993 UN sponsored elections[i]

 

Dan DRĂGHIA

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest

 

 

Abstract: As much as it is a vehicle for democratization, protest and political contention can also cause and accompany de-democratization. This article will explore a particular case of de-democratization in the contentious political context of Cambodia under the United Nations pacification mandate of 1992-93. With a traumatic recent past, a ruling elite that mostly remained in power from the previous regime and an opposition having the same authoritarian aspirations, contention and protest became the main political tool in this period of so called “democratic transformation”. In fact, this period facilitated for the former communist elite, disguised now in a democracy and free market promoter, the reshaping of the regime according to the new international imperatives. Protest played a key role in this transformation, being mainly used to justify a strong hand by the government, who argued with the danger of a new civil war.

 

Keywords: Cambodia, protest, de-democratization, Hun-Sen, elections

 

           

1.       INTRODUCTION

 

According to most of the researchers specialized in the country study, in May 1993 Cambodia held its first and until now its last relatively free and fair elections[ii]. After a long history of conflict, the incentives coming from the international community met the desire of the majority of factions involved in the decades long civil war and pushed them to start negotiating a peaceful solution, put on paper through the Paris Peace Accords from October 1991. The 1993 elections were the culmination of this negotiation process, promising to represent a fresh start toward deepening a fragile negotiated democratization. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the international body that supervised the transition from conflict and organized the elections was pleased with the result, as well as the two main participants who formed a large coalition government with equal rights.

At least so they declared publicly. But four years later, in July 1997, an apparently out of nowhere coup lead by one of the co-prime-ministers, Hun Sen, the leader of the former pro-Vietnamese communist party in power (Cambodia People’s Party - CPP), ousted the royalist forces from FUNCINPEC coalition (Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique, et coopératif)[iii]. This lead to the installation of a personal regime that has been preserved mostly unchanged since then[iv]. In this way, we think that Cambodia moved away from a relatively broad, equal, binding, and protected consultation (in elections and day to day politics) which at a minimal criteria stands for democracy toward rather arbitrary/ de façade consultation[v].

What went wrong in the four years which brought a retreat of democratization? Of course a lot of things were not suitable with the new democracy. Summarizing these wrong doings, this article will try to concentrate upon one particular feature of democratization, namely political protest, but in the opposite direction, to de-democratization. If the group consisting of Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam have developed the general framework for protest and democratization/de-democratization[vi], there are several researchers that focused on particular cases of de-democratization through protest and developed relevant interpretations for this.

One of these researchers that we’ll use here is Nancy Bermeo, who shows with examples from interwar Europe and Latin America that contention and protest can sometimes hinder rather than help democratization[vii]. Especially in relation with citizens, Bermeo argues that an instable political environment, dominated by contention and protest, could very well shift off people’s preferences from democracy[viii]. Going with the argument further, we can say and we’ll argue in the followings with regard to Cambodia that though it might not necessary represent a support for authoritarianism, such popular confusion can be sometimes instrumented by those interested in suppressing democracy, especially in a favorable context. It was the case in interwar Europe especially with Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, as well as in Latin America with Cuba or Chile.

Basically, Bermeo’s argument develops Sartori’s polarization thesis, which shows that democracies (or democratizing societies) can de-democratize from bellow in crisis situation, when radical political forces gain popular support at the expense of pro-system parties[ix]. But this interpretation can be very well applied also to societies under democratization, coming out of dictatorial regimes. In Cambodia’s case, kind of like in Romania at the beginning of the nineties, the justification of the former communist ruling elite was stating that order under its autocracy is more desirable than a disorganized democracy. And many people approved this vision about a controlled democracy, which de-facto represented a de-democratization.

Coming back to Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam and to their theorization, we’ll use for explaining regime changes its core concept, which is political opportunity structure[x]. It means that, as opposed to Romania for example, Cambodia had after the 1993 elections an overall (domestic and international) context which favored de-democratization. Protest against the former communist elite perceived as trying to perpetuate its power was the general background on which democratization took place in Romania and, on the contrary, de-democratization occurred in Cambodia. This evolution in the case of Cambodia will be explored alongside three lines that we think are essential for the context of democratization and that shaped the above mentioned political opportunity structure: the legacy of the past, especially the recent one, more problematic in the case of Cambodia; the external influences on the country, which in Cambodia came more from the authoritarian powers; and the characteristics of the politics in Cambodia, which of course depended heavily on the first two lines.

           

 

2.       PREMISES OF FAILURE?

 

            One of the usual assumptions regarding Cambodia and its failed democratization is the fact that the country just did not have the proper culture for this kind of evolution. More than this, some authors, who are not as marginal, like David Roberts[xi], argue that the Khmer social and political culture is rather opposed to democracy, being “violent”, “absolutist” and having an “innate resistance to power sharing”[xii]. Some view these assertions as nothing more than stereotypes of “Asian values” in general[xiii]. Taking into account these observations, we’ll try to identify and briefly describe some preliminary obstacles to democratization that are more solid than mere stereotypes and are placed, like our general approach, in context.

            To sketch a short political history of Cambodia after its independence, obtained in 1953, we have to say that the country was ruled since then by three out of four factions who signed the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and who represented the main political forces after that, until 1997. Each of three ruled in a more or less authoritarian manner, with the Khmer Rouge / Democratic Kampuchea – DK / National Army of Democratic Kampuchea - NADK (1975-1979) being the most repressive ones, followed by the Vietnamese backed People’s Republic of Kampuchea – PRK / State of Cambodia – SOC (1979 – 1989 / 1989 - 1993) and the royalists grouped in FUNCIPEC (1953 - 1970). The other significant factions that marked the modern political history of Cambodia were: the Khmer Republic (1970-1975), reinvented after 1991 as the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), ruled by Sak Sutsakhan, a former general of Lon Nol, the dictator of the republic; and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front – KPNLF, a neutral political movement that rejected both the Khmer Rouge and the pro-Vietnamese regime, created in exile in 1979 by Son Sann, a former prime-minister during the kingdom years, in 1967-1968.

So in different stages of Cambodian post-independence history one of the above mentioned groups oppressed the other ones[xiv]. Beyond the simple “violence” of the political landscape mentioned by Roberts, that can also be found in other countries which eventually democratized, the problem with this political background was that the mutual mistrust was widespread and hindered almost any other internal democratic initiative that went beyond the international mediation. More than this, none of the major political actors involved in transition had a democratic experience behind[xv].

            A second “premise of failure” came from the highly privileged position of the PRK elite and of the political party that inherited it, Cambodia’s People Party – CPP, after the 1991 transformation from the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party – KPRP. Inheriting the historical tradition of the Indochinese Communist Party mainly through its privileged relationship with the area dominant Vietnamese party, KPRP was helped by its more powerful neighbors to oust the Khmer Rouge from power in January 1979. In this way they installed a Vietnamese backed regime that officially lasted until 1989, when all of a sudden, due to international evolutions, the regime changed the name of the country in State of Cambodia and renounced socialism, with the party modification coming gradually all the way to 1991[xvi]. During this period of more than ten years, the PRK had enough time and means to establish itself as the dominant political force in Cambodia.  At the same time, sensing the new direction of international politics, KPRP/CPP has opened itself to internal political negotiations and external outputs for this, placing itself as the controlling force of the pacification process.           

Moving to the people of Cambodia, we have to say first that, in comparison to the Khmer Rouge criminal regime[xvii], the PRK rule came as a real relief for the general population. By this simple fact and because the NADK continued to operate as guerilla, keeping though a permanent fear of a Khmer Rouge return, many Cambodians didn’t oppose the PRK regime[xviii] and developed a dependence on the regime’s bigger and small elites mainly through networks of patron-client nature which are traditional to Cambodian society[xix]. Who controlled these networks controlled the society and the politics of Cambodia. This allowed the KPRP to open the country for international aid and for internal rivals, keeping at the same time a strict control throughout the Cambodian society.

As we can see, internally, the stage was set for the dominance of one group. Though meaningful and shaping the Cambodian society, those internal anti-democratic characteristics emphasized by David Roberts and placed in context by us, were not the decisive factor in relation with democratization. We can argue that Romania had more or less the same pre-conditions in 1989. They undoubtedly contributed to the failure of democracy, but the process unfolded mainly due to the actions of the political actors, both domestic and foreign. The international intervention, though it started with and had good intentions, ended up by helping institutionalize in a semi-democratic status this complicated system of networks mastered by the former communist party[xx].

 

 

3.       INTERNATIONAL MIS/INTEREST

 

            Very much involved in the transition and democratization of the country, we can say that the international community has had kind of an ambiguous approach toward Cambodia. This approach eventually contributed to de-democratization by not keeping a constant and sincere pressure on the regime, but rather a fragmented and interested one. Furthermore, when we say “mis/interest” we refer to an attitude oriented not to the political core of democracy, but rather to the economic aspects of it. It means that after the post-communist regime had introduced a controlled free market with benefits for chosen foreign investors, the political conditions of democracy became less and less a real concern for the international community[xxi]. Thus, after the 1993 elections, international protests for a protected consultation that was eroded became more and more rare or at least superficial.

            To detail this argument, in the case of Cambodia two facets of external intervention can be identified: one was represented by the international organizations, most notably the United Nations (UN) and what we can call the transnational civil society, with the other one being represented by countries and/or group of countries interested in the region[xxii]. In this respect, as opposed to Romania and the greater area of Eastern Europe, Cambodia received less attention from the democratic international community, though the involvement seemed at a first glance much more committed[xxiii].

Explaining this paradox, we can argue that if during the Cold War Indo-China represented the main stage of confrontation between the two political blocks, after 1989 Eastern-Europe became the main focus of the Western powers' offense. If we look at Cambodia, the settlement of the conflict as an international problem in the early 1990s only became possible once the more distant great powers (USA and USSR) disengaged, to leave the historically engaged neighboring countries to reach a settlement based on the then-current distribution of power between them[xxiv]. In this way, the country’s evolution was linked very much with the regional rivalries and embedded in the local traditions, which the international community had to accommodate in order to succeed in democratization.

 As the international arena, in spite of the multitude of international organizations with more or less real power, is dominated by powerful state actors, disengaging great powers from Cambodia made way for a UN intervention[xxv]. The most important and probably the biggest failure of international democratization in Cambodia, as it genuinely pursued democratization, was the UNTAC mission. Several analysis point out that the UNTAC activity mainly, but also other international contributors to Cambodia’s democratization, did not manage to keep themselves above the local political tradition. On the contrary, the model that they brought became so mixed with the local politics that the parties got accustomed with it, preserving at the same time their normal modus operandi, also harming the economy[xxvi]. So we have a situation in which “political parties have habituated themselves to contestation in an interventionary context, as a means to avoid habituation to locally-operating democratic procedures”[xxvii]. Though the UNTAC mission has ended long time ago, we can still find today a significant amount of donors, most notably the European Union, that are supporting democratization in Cambodia, even with the same prime-minister as two decades ago[xxviii].

The other category of external actors that pushed for democratization in Cambodia were the democratic (Western) powers, especially the US, Japan and the EU. As we mentioned above, the push for democratization of these power poles rarely and never too seriously did go beyond the discursive claims. In this respect, the general approach of the old and also the new Cambodian regime after 1991 was to open the economy of the country for international investors as a means of diverting the international attention from the political problems[xxix]. And this solution was even better for the regime in a country were the gap between elites and the normal people or between the urban and the rural areas was very high, not to mention the fact that the civil society was very weak to help the protest for the people, at least at the beginnings of the 90’s.

Nevertheless, civil society, with its characteristic of being at least theoretically outside of the authorities' control and with its tradition of opposing the authority, became the favorite realm of manifestation for international non-state organizations. With their universal democratizing vocation, such local representatives of the international organizations raised the most numerous and loudest problems of democratization in relation not only with the regime, but also with the political parties in general. Furthermore, without their deliberate will, these organizations and/or groups advocated also the claims of the opposition, constituting the main actor that opposed the government practices regarding democracy. In this context, political protest and confrontation became an ever present form of manifestation, available for every group, whether political or of the civil society, but workable only by those who controlled the power networks.

 

 

4.       A CONFRONTATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA

 

Beside the characteristics of the internal political background that we have sketched after the Introduction, the most important thing to highlight here is that in 1991 Cambodia was coming after almost 25 years of civil war[xxx], which started in 1967 as a conflict derived from the Vietnam War. So, we have a society in which the most violent form of political contention[xxxi] was a norm for at least one generation before the transition started and where the former combatants became the political parties of the transition[xxxii]. Temporary alliances were present even before the transition started, contributing to a political landscape significantly more complicated than the simple one against each other picture, unclear with multiple power and protest poles. For example, the main opposition against the PRK was the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), created in June 1982 by the Khmer Rouge, the FUNCIPEC and KPNLF, and backed by the international community in spite of the presence of Pol Pot faction.

Like in Romania in December 1989 with the Council of National Salvation Front (commonly known as CFSN), in Cambodia, after more than three years of negotiations mediated mostly by UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cambodians managed to form the Supreme National Council (SNC). Created in December 1991 and made up of representatives from all the four former combatants (the government, Khmer Rouge, royalists and KPLNF), it was the main political point of the Paris Peace Accords. Its role was to “commit all Cambodian parties and armed forces to the provisions of this Agreement” (Art. 28 from Paris)[xxxiii], meaning a neutral political environment from where the democratization to start. As this was not enough of an assurance for the international community, the pre-elections pacification took place under the supervision of UNTAC, which was delegated extensive powers by the government for an interim period in 1992–1993, in order to conduct the election and serve also as a mechanism for the transition to the post-election phase[xxxiv].

Unfortunately, as in Romania with the group around Ion Iliescu, one of the four political factions, the Hun Sen government, with all the cessations made especially to UNTAC and to the royalists[xxxv], remained mostly in power[xxxvi], ‘inviting’ the other factions to challenge its position. In this way a logic of confrontation, very far from the compromise required in this kind of situations, was perpetuated, even though not similar with that of the civil war, but hot enough to keep protest at the core of political interaction and produce frequent violence. To have a complete picture, we can also add here the violent nature of the Khmer Rouge, still commanded by Pol Pot, and the militaristic propensity of the former republicans, presided by Sak Sutsakhan, a former Lon Nol general from the 1970-1975 period.

In fact, as we showed in the previous section, the UNTAC, which acted as a provisional government tasked with preparing and supervising the elections, could not overcome the political logic that we described above. Thus, all the external actors involved in pacifying Cambodia ended up within the process of transition supporting one group or another. Inertial we might say, UNTAC was forced to collaborate with the local authorities, even though officially CPP was an opposition party under the international provisional administration. It ended up kind of legitimizing the CPP rule, partly by supporting its new pro-market rhetoric and by blaming the excesses of the other communist party, the Khmer Rouge[xxxvii]. Suggestion- the phrase is too long, rephrase At  the same time, the independent international actors, among which the most active ones were the NGO’s involved in the training of political parties according to democratic principles, supported the opposition parties to CPP[xxxviii], and especially FUNCIPEC, but to some extent also the KPLNF and BLDP. Though the Khmer Rouge were active participants in all the peace settlements until Paris because they represented the most important internal military opposition, after the pacification they started to be marginalized as a consequence of their brutal rule from the past, which under the new conditions made any association with them, either external or internal, difficult Nevertheless, they remained active and put additional pressure in the direction of political violence, either through direct action or through separate settlements with the other factions.

With all the resources invested by the UN[xxxix], the politics that counted in Cambodia remained the domain of the local factions, the main negotiations being made in a small circle of government officials and Sihanouk’s partisans[xl], with the CPP dominating heavily. Thanks to the patron-client networks, the countryside was violently, if necessary, controlled by the CPP, while the urban areas, and mainly the capital Phnom Penh, remained the only places of real political battle[xli]. The electoral process and, in particular, the resulting government from the 1993 elections showed very well that the attribution of power in Cambodia was still determined to a large extent by factional infighting rather than by democratic processes[xlii]. In other words, the founding moment of democracy carried in itself also the roots for de-democratization.

Unlike Romania in May 1990, the elections in Cambodia were won by the opposition, namely the FUNCIPEC, with 45%, with the ruling CPP coming second with 38%. The other political forces, and especially KPNLF and BLDP, as the Khmer Rouge boycotted the elections, gathered only 12%. Though UNTAC registered numerous incidents, coming especially in the Khmer Rouge controlled areas where the elections were banned and as intimidations by the CPP government, the elections were considered as reflecting the people’s will[xliii]. Paradoxically, such a democratic result affected the chances of real democratization, as the CPP fully understood “the dangers” of protected consultation and started to press by subtle, but strong means, a political scene as divided as during the civil war. The general fear of resuming the conflict influenced everybody’s decisions, but in context helped the CPP. Protest from every faction part was ever present and favored the most resourceful one, the pre-elections government.

 To better understand what the culture of participation was from the part of the majority of Cambodian politicians we can mention here a meeting in January 1994 between ambassador Julio Jeldres, who later become the official biographer of King Norodom Sihanouk, and an important cabinet minister from FUNCIPEC, “a party that had campaigned on a platform promising full respect for human rights and a democratic future for Cambodia”[xliv]. Basically, that minister was saying that there were too many political demonstrations and considered the country not ready for democracy. We can trace here the fundamental misconception about democracy and its timing in Cambodian politics as even the so called “democratic forces” that had to pressure the CPP in the direction of democratization did not believe too much in this project[xlv].

            The first priority for the CPP was the NADK, who represented the biggest challenge in terms of military power, organization and controlled territory. After the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989 and the new gained respectability of the PRK/SOC, the Khmer Rouge suddenly lost all their legitimation as a communist alternative and became more and more dispensable, if not desirable to be avoided by any parts involved in the peace process because of their genocidal past. Though included in the general framework of the negotiations due to the capacities they had in the countryside, they were impeded to officially reclaim their negotiated place[xlvi]. For example, in November 1991, when Khieu Samphan (the signatory of the Paris Accords for the Khmer Rouge as Pol Pot was too compromised) arrived to Phnom Penh as a member of SNC, a violent demonstration allegedly organized by the government forced him out of the country back to Thailand, near the border with Cambodia where the main insurgency of Pol Pot was localized[xlvii]. On the other hand, as the main problem with the Khmer Rouge was to be judged for their crimes as part of the democratization process, the CPP systematically eluded this kind of actions as being a danger for Cambodia’s stability, risking though to break up the country. Still today, after several condemnations for genocide, Hun Sen has a similar point of view[xlviii]. In fact, being himself a former DK combatant, Hun Sen was trying to subtly and individually attract the Khmer Rouge without an official alliance with their organization.

            With FUNCIPEC the strategy was different: officially making an alliance with the royalists, but at the same time fighting them away from political meaningfulness in the day to day administration of the country. When the CPP lost the elections, Hun Sen brought the spectrum of the civil war in the public discourse and in the talks with the other political forces[xlix], which was very close, especially because the hostilities were resumed by the Khmer Rouge after they were banned from their negotiated political position. In this way a compromise resulted that of course favored the CPP which kept its control over the police, the army and most of the administration[l]. Ceremonially presided by the newly reinstated King Norodom Sihanouk, the new government was a coalition between FUNCIPEC and CPP, Prince Norodom Ranariddh acting as First Prime-Minister and Hun Sen as Second Prime-Minister. Beside the fact that the formula perverted the result of the elections[li], a government with two heads was in itself a source of conflict. Not surprisingly if we look at the fear of a resurrected civil war which would have meant the failure of a costly and symbolically important peace operation, UNTAC accepted the new coalition even though, as we said, it kind of contradicted the objective of the elections. In September 1993, the UN mission withdrew from Cambodia, leaving the country roughly like two years before, when started the pacification mission. Except the civil war, which was significantly reduced to scattered fights between the government and the Khmer Rouge near the Thailand border, with respect to democratization, few things really changed.

 

 

5.       CONCLUSION

 

            Democratization is not a road with only one direction, to democracy. At some point in time, even at the beginning as we saw in the Cambodian case, this road can lead to de-democratization. Though it needs a lot of variables to work properly in order to achieve the end goal of democracy under the indicators that we stated in the Introduction (protected consultation), it usually starts from the sincere desire of at least one political actor working within a polity. Even if this actor in one moment or another does not have the means to succeed, it is decisive to have the openness to respect the democratic principles and rules when the moment comes. Without this openness nothing can be achieved to produce and support democracy because all the actions have the potential to be diverted. One of the easiest ways to divert actions toward democracy is protest as it is relatively facile to organize and can bring a lot of political gains. 

            Having an extreme violent background, at the beginning of the 1990’s, Cambodia had the potential of a classical example of radical change toward democratization. Apparently, all the external and internal forces involved in the process wanted the same thing: to extract the country from conflict and put it on track for a functional democracy. As it turned out, the political factions from within the country remained in the same belligerent logic, wanting the entire power also in democracy and using all the methods to capture it. Protest was only one of the tools for this purpose and has been mastered properly only by those who controlled the main branches of power, namely the administration, the police, and just in case, the army. In the end, by the withdrawal of the UNTAC mission and eventually by the coup in July 1997, this entire process of trying to democratize Cambodia offered a legitimate transitional process to the former pro-Vietnamese communists grouped in the Cambodian People Party and guided by long-serving prime-minister Hun Sen.

 

           

Bibliography

 

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[i] This work was possible due to the financial support of the Sectorial Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 with the title „Young successful researchers – professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment”.

[ii] John TULLY, A Short History of Cambodia: from Empire to Survival, Allen & Unwin, 2005, p. 221.

[iii] See Buddhism and the Making of Democracy in Cambodia: A Report to Cambodian Buddhist Council, Monychenda Heng, 1998, p. 4.

[iv] See Markus KARBAUM, , “Cambodia’s Façade Democracy and European Assistance”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 111-143.

[v] See Charles TILLY, Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 205. See also Idem, Contention and Democracy in Europe. 1650-2000, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 13-14.

[vi] See mainly Doug McADAM, Sidney TARROW, Charles TILLY, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge University Press, 2004, Charles TILLY, Regimes and Repertoires, University of Chicago Press, 2006 and Sidney TARROW, Charles TILLY, Contentious Politics, Paradigm Publishers, 2007.

[vii] Graeme B. ROBERTSON, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 38.

[viii] Nancy BERMEO, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 4.

[ix] W. RAND SMITH, review at Nancy BERMEO, Ordinary … cit., in Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Autumn, 2004), p. 131.

[x] Sidney TARROW, Charles TILLY, Contentious…cit., pp. 49, 189-190.

[xi] See David ROBERTS, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991- 99: Power, Elitism and Democracy, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001. For comparison and a better insight into the subject, see Leakthina Chau-Pech OLLIER, Tim WINTER (eds), Expressions of Cambodia. The politics of tradition, identity, and change, Routledge, 2006, pp. 1-20.

[xii] Simon SPRINGER, Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order. Violence, authoritarianism, and the contestation of the public space, Routledge, 2010, p. 65.

[xiii] Idem, pp. 65-66.

[xiv] Caroline HUGHES, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991–2001, Routledge, 2003, pp. 1-2.

[xv] See Tooch VAN, International Aid and Democracy Building Process: Cambodia, Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, Fletcher School – Tufts University, April 2004, pp. 18-23.

[xvi] See John TULLY, A Short History…cit., pp. 142, 198, 211-212.

[xvii] There are a lot of references regarding the ruthlessness of the regime directed by Pol Pot. Because he is a renowned specialist on the subject and be conducts with very good results the “Cambodia Genocide Program” at Yale University, a very good reference is Ben KIERNAN, The Pol Pot Regime. Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79, Yale University Press, 2002. For a brief and more accessible description, especially from the perspective of a survivor you can see Dan DRĂGHIA, review at Rithy Panh, Christophe Bataille, „Eliminarea. Povestea unui supraviețuitor din infernul khmerilor roșii [Elimination. The Story of a Survivor from the Khmer Rouge Inferno], translation by Cătălina Mihai, Editura Corint, București, 2013, 208 p., in Analele Universității București Seria Științe Politice [The Annals of the University of Bucharest – Political Science Series], Year XVI – 2014, No. 2, pp. 141-146.

[xviii] John TULLY, A Short History…cit., p. 202.

[xix] Pierre P. LIZÉE, Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia. Global Governance and the Failure of International Conflict Resolution, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000, pp. 30-31.

[xx] See Caroline HUGHES, Transforming Oppositions in Cambodia, paper for the ECPR workshop on Political Parties in the Third World, 6-11 April 2001, Grenoble, accessible online at the address http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/4ea82ed0-7071-45c7-a685-e0a96e510e61.pdf [09.08.2015].

[xxi] Simon SPRINGER, Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order… cit., pp. 1-13.

[xxii] Sorpong PEOU, International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding. Cambodia and Beyond, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 17.

[xxiii] See Jim SONG, “The political dynamics of the peacemaking process in Cambodia”, in Michael W. DOYLE, Ian JOHNSTONE, Robert C. ORR, (eds.), Keeping the peace. Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 53-81.

[xxiv] Michael YAHUDA, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, Routledge, 2004, p. 13.

[xxv] From the Cold War experience we know that when a great power really has an interest and wants to engage in a country usually fuels a more or less direct intervention, as opposed to international intervention, which represents rather a disengagement [n.n.].

[xxvi] Michael W. DOYLE, Ian JOHNSTONE, Robert C. ORR, (eds.), Keeping… cit, p. 186.

[xxvii] Caroline HUGHES, Transforming Oppositions… cit,  p. 5.

[xxviii] Markus KARBAUM, “Cambodia’s Façade … cit”, pp. 117-118.

[xxix] Caroline HUGHES, The Political Economy… cit, pp. 39-44.

[xxx] When we say civil war we mean that at any given time it was at least one insurgency within the country’s territory.

[xxxi] For a delimitation and a definition of different forms of contention across time and space see Chapter 6, “Collective Violence”, in Charles TILLY, Regimes… cit, pp. 118-150.

[xxxii] Balakrishnan RAJAGOPAL, International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 142.

[xxxiii] Sorpong PEOU, International… cit., p. 64.

[xxxiv] Balakrishnan RAJAGOPAL, International… cit., pp. 139-140.

[xxxv] Prince Norodom Sihanouk was reinstated as King of Cambodia and invited to preside over the SNC.

[xxxvi] See Julio A. JELDRES, “Cambodia's Fading Hopes”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 7, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 148-157.

[xxxvii] Balakrishnan RAJAGOPAL, International… cit., p. 142.

[xxxviii] Ibidem, pp. 142-143.

[xxxix] Leakthina Chau-Pech OLLIER, Tim WINTER, (eds), Expressions… cit., p. 8.

[xl] Pierre P. LIZÉE, Peace… cit., p. 11.

[xli] Simon SPRINGER, Cambodia’s… cit, p. 8.

[xlii] Pierre P. LIZÉE, Peace… cit., p. 11.

[xliii] John TULLY, A Short History…cit., p. 221.

[xliv] Julio A. JELDRES, “Cambodia's… cit.”, p. 152.

[xlv] Even though they didn’t won the elections in the beginning, at least Romania had some political forces and several politicians truly dedicated to democratic principles that pressured the neo-communist power permanently.

[xlvi] Michael W. DOYLE, Ian JOHNSTONE, Robert C. ORR, (eds.), Keeping… cit, pp. 10-11.

[xlvii] See Charles P. WALLACE, “Students, Police Clash in Cambodia: Protest: Violence is aimed at alleged government corruption. Khmer Rouge leaders delay return to capital”, in Los Angeles Times, 22 December 1991, accessible online at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-12-22/news/mn-1607_1_khmer-rouge [11.08.2015].

[xlviii] Prak CHAN TUL, “Hun Sen hostility puts decade-old U.N. Khmer Rouge tribunal in doubt”, accessible at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/21/us-cambodia-rouge-idUSKBN0NC0UZ20150421 [11.08.2015].

[xlix] Simon SPRINGER, Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order… cit., pp. 70-71.

[l] Sorpong PEOU, International… cit., pp. 104-105.

[li] John TULLY, A Short History…cit., pp. 222-223.