Coordinated by Aurelian GIUGĂL


Stability and dissolution of coalition government in Central and Eastern Europe


Teodora-Maria DAGHIE

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest[i]



Abstract: This article takes a comparative approach the formation of coalition governments in Central and Eastern Europe with a case study on Romania and Poland. Of all the elements of the international wave of democratization that began two decades ago, the transformation of communist political systems, which were once thought as impervious to liberalization can be considered as being the most dramatic. After the anti-communist revolutions, the former Soviet satellites have officially declared their renunciation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and have disintegrated, in varying degrees, the apparatus of communist dictatorship and socialist economic planning. In many countries this transformation has led to a reinvention of politics, in the sense of genuine public debate about the purposes of society and state, and has produced significant progress toward the establishment of a liberal- democratic order. My article analyses the evolution and stability of the governmental coalitions in Romania and Poland through a comparative analysis of the party systems in the 1990.


Keywords: Romania, Poland, coalition, government, formation.





The content, features and attributes of the government is one of the most important and distinct state institutions. The importance of this power stems from the fact that it is the one that effectively runs the life of the society. Therefore, it is the most directly related to the citizen. In political theory and practice the institution is known as executive is directly related to the separation of powers. In consequence and in political practice, this institution is known as the government, in most cases, the council of ministers, cabinet etc. Its name being largely determined by the constitutional system, its structure, or certain historical traditions.

From a historical point of view, the concept of coalitions had a brief history in the organizing theory. From the beginning this concept has been used in the conflicts that appeared between the individuals, groups or subgroups that wanted to pursue their goals and in the same time they wanted to have the possibility to form coalitions in order to obtain that goal[ii]. However, some scholars have also discussed the constraints that might appear and how had these constrains influenced the formation of coalitions. Recently, these coalitions had been used to explain how the individual attempts could have transformed into a collective action that took place within the organization. Moreover, it was highlighted the fact that due to the usage of different perspectives that had been provided by various scholars, the concept of coalitions had suffered important modifications in the organizational literature[iii].

In a reaction to the assumption that highlighted the fact organizations have simple well-defined goals came the idea that individuals have the capacity to come together in order to form a coalition. The scholars that studied it did not consider that in an organization that had as potential to become a coalition conflicting and ambiguous goals could exist[iv]. Weber, Gulick and Urwick argued that the goals expressed by the organization had to be clearly established[v]. However, this assumption was later questioned by Herbert Simon and by his colleagues. March and Simon were considered as being the first ones to introduce the notion of conflict in the organization with regards to the purposes of that organization[vi]. These two scholars have raised in Organizations’ the issue that referred to the possibility of having conflict inside the organizations and also discussed about coalitions but the two scholars never mentioned coalitions that might be formed within a certain organization[vii].

Nevertheless, the initial two scholars who focused on coalitions within organizations were Cyert and March. These two scholars remarked that coalitions formed of managers, stakeholders and employees were the first ones to shift and also to become unstable. In explaining this statement, they argued that “but over a specified (relatively brief) period of time, we can identify the major coalition members or for a particular decision, we can identify the major coalition members”[viii]. The two scholars highlighted the fact that shifting coalitions might influence decisions and goal setting and might lead to the change in problem solving management because they might become less stable and predictable[ix]. However, the two scholars also argued that distinct coalitions had the capacity to pursue different goals, which could lead to the impossibility of that organization to pursue all the different goals. The possible outcomes that could come out of coalition bargaining might be budgets, the allocation of functions and organizational precedents[x]. These outcomes are not perceived as having a negative impact, but on the contrary, they are seen as being the ones that could stabilize the organization by providing it money in order to be able to pay them members.

This view of organizational goal allowed the organization the possibility to be seen as entity that was pursuing certain goals or some preferences, which were expressed by the individuals. However, the decision-making model of organizations had partially abandoned the insight which was made by Simion which suggested that organizational positions largely determined the information and the resources that were available to the members and thus by implications the formal positions were the ones that gave to the actors more influence than the others[xi].

However, it has to be stressed that management was considered as being the chief member of what other authors referred to it as the “dominant coalition” in the organization. The large implication is not drawn out because it would conflict with the assumption that everyone is involved in the internal market for goals. In addition, Cyert and March implied that the relationships between the hierarchical position, and the authority relationships were emphasized in the process of the goal setting, and the conflict was resolved sequentially by the adaption to the goals and to the distribution of the resources[xii].

Cyert and March, did not distinguished between the organization as a coalition and the organization made of multiple coalitions dominations. They perceived the two bodies as being equal but did not abandon the idea that within a firm or an organization there might exist multiple coalitions: “We assume a set of coalition members, actual or potential. Whether these members are individuals or groups is unimportant. Some of the possible subsets drawn from this set are considered as being viable coalitions. They attempted to develop a theory of goal formation, although they were not interested in the dynamics of the coalitions. However, they considered the usage of the term as a surrogate for the organization is troublesome. In order to affirm that a coalition exists one should also take into account the possibility of the existence of some members were not part of the coalition. The concept of coalitions as it had been studied by the political scientists and by the social psychologists referred to the temporary alliances that were formed between one parts of the involved parties[xiii].

However, scholars used the term coalition to refer to everyone who had certain interests and wanted to gain some benefits from their participation in that organization. If the coalition included suppliers, customers, employees and stockholders then the term became simply a label for the collection of all the stockholders, and it was also robbed of its meaning. The readers were left with an ambiguous impression that represented organization as a negotiated order which was preferable to the classic assumptions of a mandated order[xiv]. For those reasons, they suggested the use   of the term to label the collection of all organizational stakeholders had to be abandoned and its usage had to be confirmed to a particular type of subset of organizational members that were defined below.

James Thompson followed Cyert and March, using the notion of “dominant coalition” and hypothesized the fact that coalitions were constrained by the characteristics which were provided by the environment and by the technology of that particular organization. Thus, as long as the environment and the technology of that organization generated more sources of uncertainty it existed the risk to have more power bases. Furthermore, with the growth in the number of contingency or uncertainty there was also an increase in the number of the members who formed a coalition[xv]

Thompson also provided some insights into the relationship that existed between the technology of that organization and the environment as a source of power that could lead to potential coalitions. What he failed to do was to draw the connection between the proposed discussion on coalitions and his propositions about technology and environment as promising sources of contingencies[xvi].

Technology was the one that posed coordination problems that required interdependence among the units. However, it might have been expected that these units would interact and would notice the advantages that the formation of coalitions would be, because there would be the possibility to divert an amount of resources to themselves. Even so, the variables that lead to the process of coalition formation were lacking in the formulation which was proposed by Thompson[xvii].

For Thompson, the concept of organizational coalition had virtually disappeared from the literature until last decade, when it began to emerge, a new interest in the literature on the parliamentary processes that happened in organizations. The interest in the political processes was perceived as a focus on the integration of the organizational and individual levels and also on the drawing of a theoretical model of coalition building. Nevertheless, despite this grown interest in the concept, in the end it continued to be used inconsistently[xviii].

Nevertheless, many of the scholars who had been interested in the political analysis of the processes by which the individual preferences had been transformed into organizational policy, and action mention coalitions, but they do not take a systematic exploration of the roles which are played by these individuals in coalitions or in organizations. They had also bought the notion of the dominant coalition which had been proposed by Thompson in order to be able to characterize the strategic decision making that had been undertaken by each organization. Goodman and Pennings suggested that a dominant coalition was made of direct and indirect representation, vertical and horizontal constituencies, each of them with competing expectations. They also stress the role of consensus in the functioning of the organizations[xix].

Bacharach and Lawler developed a detailed set of the hypothesis that referred to the coalition formation within the organizations. These hypotheses differed from the ones which were proposed by Pleffer. These were centered on the upper, middle and lower hierarchical levels, which were perceived as being a triad formed of individual actors. The two did not rely on the previous studies and models that had been developed in psychology and political science instead they had adapted them to the organizational context and made them to focus on the process of bargaining, on the activities which were run by the non-winning coalitions and on the effects that had vertical authority on coalitions[xx].

The development the concept of coalitions in organizations undergone suggested that it had been often used by the theorists and the researchers that focused on the organizational topics. Cyber and March were concerned with the issue which referred to the organizational goal formation; Thompson wanted to stress the ways in which organizations were constrained by the choices which considered the domain and technology and Goodman and Peannings focused on the suitable methods in order to be able to assess the performance of that organization[xxi]. These limitations are also highlighted by the virtual absence of the empirical research of this concept. In fact, after a review of the literature, it has been discovered that there were no studies, which meant to investigate the actual behavior or the activities that had been done by the coalitions as distinct entities in the organizations[xxii].






Under the 1997 Polish Constitution the Government is made of Prime Minister and the ministers, with the possibility to appoint a deputy and a number of chairmen, provided through statutory laws. Their service are subject to article 147 of the Constitution that regulates the functioning of the Cabinet. When a new Sejim is elected or whenever the office becomes free, the President has the obligation to nominate a candidate for the position of Prime Minister that should form a new cabinet and design a program. Should the appointed cabinet receive the confidence vote it becomes invested with full prerogatives.  In the unlikely case of the Cabinet not being able to receive the confidence of the Parliament, the latter will nominate a Prime Minister that if it is voted will be confirmed to office by the President[xxiii]. If this nomination doesn’t meet the confidence of the houses, the President may decide to shorten the term of the Parliament and call for early elections.

                A new Cabinet can be established after a constructive vote of no confidence that has the double role of dismissing the old cabinet and to validate a new one. In this case the President is compelled to accept the resignation of the de Prime Minister and appoint the new one. Should the government for whatsoever reasons cease to have full powers it will remain in office in charge of the administration until a new cabinet is sworn into office. The Government is also responsible for the functioning of the subsidiary bodies as provided by organic law.





                After the election or whenever the position becomes vacant, the President has to hold political consultations to identify the best suited candidate who has parliamentary support. The procedure is an expression of the will of both the President and the Parliament, the latter having the decisive role in the appointment. At this stage, the President according to art. 80, paragraph (2) of the Constitution holds consultations with the political parties represented in Parliament in order freeing a parliamentary majority for the appointment and support his staff. The appointment of the candidate for Prime Minister represents a mandate given by the President personality and it is designated for drafting the government, its program and for the submission of the request for a vote of confidence by Parliament.

For this purpose, the political consultations held between the candidate for prime minister and the party or coalition of parties that backed his nomination have to draw up a complete list of the ministers and their program. The two are developed after consultations are the entitled to seek a vote of confidence. If, within the 10 days, the candidate for prime minister will not be able to draw up the list of ministers and a program he may relinquish his nomination to the President who is obliged to redo the consultations.  A confidence vote is given by the two Chambers of Parliament in joint session as an expression of the majority of deputies and senators, the debate on the Government program and the list submitted by the candidate for prime minister.  In the case where two consecutive nominations fail to receive the vote of confidence, but no later than 90 days from the first nomination, the President can dismiss the Parliament and call for early elections. However this is not possible within the last year of the term of the Parliament.

While some voices in the literature that the social movements of the 20th century were at the origin of the so-called classical political parties in Western Europe, this view is challenged especially by those analyzing the changes in the political cleavages. We agree with Mair that a direct connection between the changes of the parties themselves and that of the system itself is difficult to be correlated[xxiv].  He goes further by postulating a direct correlation between the structural changes within the society and the behavior of the parties, stressing that the changes are the result of the evolution from a single-party system to democratic societies and to the emergence of the niche parties that aim to fill the gaps left by the traditional ones[xxv].

  In modern democracies, parliaments are the ones vested to solve the conflicts between the institutions and most of them are being titled as “supreme representative body”. A critical prerequisite of conflict resolution within a political environment is linked to the capacity of the parties to take part in a democratic competition to meet their goals[xxvi]. We can say that the need for checks and balances against the government can be fulfilled only by a practical opposition who should cooperate in a certain degree with the government. 

In most of the European systems, the formation of coalitions takes place based on established patterns connecting the main parties to niche parties with a similar doctrine (example: between the parties of a similar block, roughly defined as “left,” “right” or “center”). It is distinctly possible for the parties belonging to the same block to form coalitions; however, under special circumstances, we can witness the creation of coalitions outside the political block, for specific goals (such as the war-time coalitions).

In the Western democracies with a long-established parliamentary tradition, it is very distinctly possible to see governments supported by minority coalitions; these come as support of the individual projects of the government than for its members. The consistency of the programs and the quality of its members makes more likely that a coalition party government would gain support to develop and carry out stable policies. However, this is a very complex task, considering that the members of a coalition should share a shared perspective and collective goals, which should be joined by a common vision of their development[xxvii]. Furthermore, there should be a common path for all political parties towards enacting and implementing the legislation. This process should lead to the cooperation with the political forces which at some moment of their existence decided not to take part in the government or were not invited to be part of it.

In parliamentary democracies, the opposition usually the mirrors the government – for instance if the government is formed by a “right” party, the “leftist” party will become the “natural” opposition or the other way around. Nonetheless, in the case of solid governments, we can witness a more sundry opposition – a notable case would be the Westminster model where the rest of the House becomes the opposition. We can therefore infer that the opposition blocs have the tendency to be more different than governmental coalitions. Nonetheless, the opposition may account for the composite group of opponents of the coalition, which can have difficulties in finding a common language but even in this case they can join forces in an electoral alliance to meet power after the next elections. Contrary to the governmental coalitions, oppositions are less likely to be bound by formal agreements, thus they might often react in a distinctive way to a governmental proposal. All these factors should be linked to the uncertainty about future electoral results, and to the possibility that one or more parties’ member of the governmental coalition can withdraw or be replaced from it[xxviii].

In Western democracies the formation of a government in the absence of the creation of a coalition not seem very often – with the notable exception of the Westminster system where coalitions are rather an exception than a rule. Considering these issues, there is a broad literature on the behaviour of the parties and the development of “coalition-building”[xxix]. They are mainly quantitative and not equal applicable to all political systems (as is, such as, game theory is more suitable for the making of coalitions in the U.S. Congress than the interpretation of coalitions in the European Parliament). Quantitative theories presume rationality, customer behaviour and the high level of knowledge and compliance by all parties, the relatively balanced party room, etc, without taking account of external factors, namely political influences and pressures that come from parliamentary environment[xxx].

The table below shows of a series of models of party consolidation in all post-communist countries. It emphasizes the limited availability of the data from the elections of 1989-1990 of some former Soviet republics which used exclusively single-member district voting systems.


Table 1. Models of party system consolidation


Model IA I9S9-I990

Model IB (Trimmed) I9S9-I990

Model 2A 1994-5

Model 2B (Trimmed) 1994-5

Model IA 1999-2000

Model IB (Trimmed) 1999-2000



Ideology vote share Cl









































































0.1 S3


























Adjusted R-squared



























*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.0S, * p < 0.10.

In Model* 1A-1R. not all data were available for Armenia, Estonia. Kyrgyzstan. Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia. Moldova. Mongolia. Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Note that eight of the 11 arc former Soviet Republics*. In Model* 2A-2B, not all data were available for Kyrgyzstan Macedonia and Ukraine. In the trimmed ‘B‘ model*, less statistically significant variables* are dropped.

Source: Shale HOROWITZ and Eric C. BROWNE, “Sources of Post-Communist Party System Consolidation: Ideology versus Institutions”, Party Politics, Vol. 11, No. 6, 2005, p. 13.






            The stabilization of party systems in the new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe is perceived as being a long-winded process. By applying the Peter Mair's “government-formation model” of party system development to the two young democracies of Poland and Romania, can be highlighted that the party systems have the power to stabilize quicker[xxxi].

            James Toole highlights two important methods for the understanding the process of stabilization of the party systems but they also have important drawbacks. The analysis of electoral volatility is perceived as a product of the party system literature that studies change and stabilization in the electoral alignments that link parties to voters are just valued for its ease of measurement and for its cross-national comparability but it overlooks aspects that refer to the party system development and that are not related to party-voter relations[xxxii]. The analysis of party system consolidation, which is considered as being a product of the literature that deals with regime change and regime transition, examines all the aspects that relate to the development of the party system but tends to lack operational definitions and explicit, measurable standards[xxxiii].

            Mair’s model of analysis addresses every shortcoming by using three operational variables to obtain a cross-national comparison. He starts with the electoral volatility tradition as he considers it the proper object of analysis in examining the political parties. For this reason, the stabilization of the system occurs when the interaction becomes predictable and voters allegiance becomes clear[xxxiv],  this being used to explain the formation of governments. Worth to be mentioned that the stability of the patterns increases the stability of the system. This model is based on the study of Western Europe, as he considers that Central and Eastern European party systems can be understood only by knowing the patterns in the established ones[xxxv]. He also stresses that some parties are more prone to change than others and that the various models are important in understanding the changes that occur in the emerging systems[xxxvi].

                Mair believes that changes can only occur with the transformation of the system[xxxvii], therefore it is changed by the patterns of inter-party competition that moves one party from one class to another. Therefore a system is stable when patterns become predictable over longer time spans[xxxviii]. One of the key aspects for Mair is the separation of changes in the party systems from the changes in the electoral alignment, for this change party system is perceived as an important change in the relationship between the parties, while the change in the electoral one refers to the transformation of the relationship between parties and the electorate[xxxix]. This is done not to underestimate the importance of the relationship between the party and the voter, but rather to understand how these two phenomena that are considered as apart had an important influence one over the other. In a traditional way, Mair appreciates that party system can be regarded as the product of electoral change or as a synonym for this process[xl].

            Peter Mair adheres to the model created by Sartori, which he considers “a standard for party system analysis”[xli]. In it, Sartori uses two variables, fragmentation and ideological distance – the first being used to find out the relevant number of parties while the second is necessary to determine the degree of polarization[xlii]. Another important component in Sartori’s analysis is the delimitation between the so called moderate-pluralist systems and polarized systems[xliii]. To this, Mair notes the necessity for a new model as the new democracies had fallen in the pluralist category[xliv].

                Mair bases his analysis of Sartori’s understanding of the party systems, classifying them by the type of intra-party competition and the competition to form the government. In his model, he uses a) alteration of government or ow completely the party composition of successive governing coalitions changes at each new period of government formation; b) innovation or familiarity of the governmental formulas; c) access to power, which represents the chance of a political force to be called to be part of the government. These variables are further extended and produce either close or open competitions for power. The first are generated by a complete change in the composition of the ruling coalition, while the second maintains one or more parties in power over successive electionsartea astanu intelegta astaalutand nonehis arties and co[xlv]. For these reasons closed systems tend to be more stable, with the sides well-defined and the outcome of the elections more predictable. In the unstable ones the patterns change frequently and to a high degree, innovation and uncertainty playing a bigger role, every party being at some point allied with each of the others. For Mair, Central Europe produced an open system with a high competition for attaining the governmental leadership; his final conclusion since   a more stable system should emerge as the result of a lengthy process[xlvi].

            In order to evaluate the degree of party stabilization in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Peter Mair applies this model in two stages. First, the party systems are perceived as being modest pluralist systems by considering the typology proposed by Sartori. Second, their structures of competition for government are considered according to the three-part framework which is suggested by Mair[xlvii]. Being considered members of the moderate pluralist-category which was proposed by Sartori, the fresh democracies party systems were considered candidates for differentiation. In the parliamentary systems, the new democracies can be formed immediately after the elections or in the midst of a parliamentary term. In the summer of 1998, each of the new democracies underwent three elections since the end of communism, but only Poland had all the governments formed in the midst of the parliamentary term[xlviii].

                Mair focuses first on the alternation to power between the different parties and coalitions, this being scrutinized by examining the ingoing and outgoing governments within parliamentary terms. In the case of Poland this was common between 1993 and 1997, with two cabinet switches during the first term of the parliament and none during the second. While during the first term analysed the composition of the coalition remained the same, the elections generated a change in the composition of the coalition[xlix].

                Innovation or familiarity is the second element that defines Mair’s model, meaning that a governing formula represents the combination of parties that form the coalition. Its analysis shows the degree in which coalitions are composed of the same parties each time they regain power. Familiarity indicates the stability of a governing formula while innovation is considered the element that keeps open the alternatives[l].

                Mair suggests that one result that separates the party system from the electoral change is “the recognition that change in the party systems may be due to factors other than electoral change- factors such as changes in elite behaviour and party strategy”. In his analysis, the electoral influences over the party stabilization in East Central Europe have been negligible and the institutional influences have been indirect[li]. He believes the new party systems to have important elements that show us their stability. His analysis of patterns that emerge in these new democracies do produce important conclusions on the implications and stabilization of the party system[lii].

            First, it appears that there is a progression in the stabilization of party systems in which the three variables are addressed sequentially. Also, familiarity with the formulas used in governing coalitions and a closure of access to government are more difficult to achieve. Second the electoral systems play an important role in the party systems stabilization by helping to lower the levels of fragmentation. The low levels of fragmentation make it possible for a small group of elites to dominate the party-system[liii].



            5. CONCLUSIONS


In this article, I investigated stability and dissolution of coalition governments in Romania and Poland. The first part examines the broad concept, presenting the important trends in its definition. Cabinet coalitions in multiparty democracies have a precarious existence. The legislative majorities can dismiss the cabinet at will and can force early elections through the parliamentary dissolution. Coalition termination can have real political consequences, and it is important to notice and understand why such decisions are taken. Some politicians may be forced from the cabinet offices without noticing what happened to them. Others choose their date of departure and leave the cabinet with sad faces. Some coalitions may cause important changes in the party system after their dissolution, while others may their struggles to the “country” and leave the final decision to the voters[liv].

                A question that still needs to be asked is how we can identify the precise moment that leads to a change of governments, one possible explanation being that for some assemblies is possible to recall a cabinet without forcing general elections. Once we establish the case we are into we can easily identify the patterns in which coalitions form and dissolve governments.

                We agree with Grofman that most parties tend to end the life of cabinets when they expect the greatest electoral gain, although favourable prospects are not a necessary but sufficient condition to either coalition termination or parliamentary dissolution[lv]. The anticipation of good electoral fortune gives to the parties the possibility to have a bargaining chip that can be exploited either by renegotiating the existing balance of power by protecting the existing cabinet[lvi].

            Another important conclusion refers to the possibility of amendment the maxim that talks about three-party legislatures: “the governing coalition will comprise the largest and smallest legislative parties[lvii]“. In this situation the advantages that are obtained refer to the other factors such as electoral prospects or the policy and the office-driven gains from trade. Nevertheless, coalitions can be affected by events which can either strengthen or vanish them and some of them can lead to coalition termination and parliamentary dissolution, but they do not necessarily depend on the electoral cycle.

            This theory does not offer us an in-depth understanding of the electoral strategies that the parties use to gain more votes and seats, of the party discipline in the legislature, the relationship between the government and the opposition or the problem of the re-legitimization of the successor parties as acceptable partners to form coalitions in the newly established democracies. Lastly, the comparative literature on government coalitions and cabinet stability has moved on stressing the importance that timing has on parliamentary elections, the expectations of electoral gain of a certain person player or the assessment of the costs and benefits that a status quo cabinet might have. 

            This theory does not offer us an in-depth understanding of the electoral strategies that the parties use to gain more votes and seats, of the party discipline in the legislature, the relationship between the government and the opposition or the problem of the re-legitimization of the successor parties as acceptable partners to form coalitions in the newly established democracies. Lastly, the comparative literature on government coalitions and cabinet stability have moved on stressing the importance that timing has on parliamentary elections, the expectations of electoral gain of a certain person player or the assessment of the costs and benefits that a status quo cabinet might have.[lviii]





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[i] This paper was supported by the "Successful youth researchers - professional development in an interdisciplinary and international context project" POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400, financed by the European Social Fund through the Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.


[ii] William B. STEVENSON, Jone L. PEARCE and Lyman W. PORTER, “The Concept of  «Coalition» in Organizing Theory and Research”, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1985, p. 257.

[iii] Ibidem.

[iv] Ibidem.

[v] L. GULICK and L. URWICK, Papers in the science of administration, Institute of Public Administration, New York, 1937, pp. 181-190; Max WEBER, “Bureaucracy”, in H.H. GERTH and C. W. MILLS, Max Weber: Essays in sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, pp. 196-249.

[vi] J.G. MARCH and H. A. SIMION, Organisations, Wiley, New York, 1958.

[vii] Ibidem.

[viii] William B. STEVENSON, Jone  L. PEARCE and Lyman W. PORTER, “The Concept of…cit.”, p. 257; R. M. CYERT and J.C. MARCH, A behavioral theory of the firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, p. 27.

[ix] William B. STEVENSON, Jone L. PEARCE and Lyman W. PORTER, “The Concept of…cit.”, p. 257.

[x] Ibidem.

[xi] Ibidem.

[xii] Ibidem, p. 258.

[xiii] Ibidem, p. 258.

[xiv] Ibidem.

[xv] J. C. THOMPSON, Organisationsin action, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, p. 130.

[xvi] Ibidem, p. 135.

[xvii] William B. STEVENSON, Jone L. PEARCE and Lyman W. PORTER, “The Concept of…cit.”, p. 258.

[xviii] Ibidem.

[xix] P.S. GOODMAN and J.M. PENNINGS, New perspectives on organizational effectiveness, Jossey-Bass, New Francisco, 1977, p. 157.

[xx] William B. STEVENSON, Jone L. PEARCE and Lyman W. PORTER, “The Concept of…cit.”, p. 260.

[xxi] Ibidem.

[xxii] Ibidem.

[xxiii] Ibidem.

[xxiv] Peter MAIR, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford University Press, USA, 2005.

[xxv] Jan ROVNY, “Struggle over Dimensionality: Party Competition in Western and Eastern Europe,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2012, pp. 56-74.

[xxvi] Wolfgang C. MULLER and Kaare STROM (eds.), Policy, Office, or Votes?: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999.

[xxvii]  Rudy W. ANDEWEG, Lieven De WINTER, and Patrick DUMONT (eds.), Puzzles of Government Formation: Coalition Theory and Deviant Cases (Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science), Routledge, 2011.

[xxviii] Ibidem.

[xxix] Ibidem.

[xxx] Ibidem.

[xxxi] James TOOLE, “Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe”, Party Politics, 2000, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 441.

[xxxii] Ibidem.

[xxxiii] Ibidem, p. 441-442.

[xxxiv] James TOOLE, “Government Formation…cit.”, p. 442.

[xxxv] Peter MAIR, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p. IX.

[xxxvi] Ibidem, p. 443.

[xxxvii] Peter MAIR, op. cit., pp.51-52.

[xxxviii] James TOOLE, op. cit., p. 443.

[xxxix] Ibidem.

[xl] Peter MAIR, Party System…cit., pp. 214-215.

[xli] James TOOLE, “Government Formation…cit.”, p. 443.

[xlii] Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1976.

[xliii] James TOOLE, “Government Formation…cit.”, pp. 443-444.

[xliv] Ibidem, p. 444.

[xlv] Ibidem, p. 444.

[xlvi] Ibidem.

[xlvii] Ibidem, p.445.

[xlviii] Ibidem, p.446.

[xlix] Ibidem.

[l] Ibidem.

[li]  James TOOLE, “Government Formation…cit.”, p. 454.

[lii] Ibidem, p.456.

[liii] Ibidem.

[liv] Arthur LUPIA and Kaare STROM, “Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, 1995, p. 648.

[lv] Bernard GROFMAN, “The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration: Distinguishing Between- Country and Within-Country Effects”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1989, pp. 291-302; Bernard GROFMAN, and Peter van ROOZENDAAL, “Toward a theoretical explanation of premature cabinet termination. With application to post-war cabinets in the Netherlands”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 155-170.

[lvi] Arthur LUPIA and Kaare STROM, “Coalition Termination…cit.”, p. 649.

[lvii] David AUSTEN-SMITH and Jeffrey BANK, “Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes” American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 1988, 405-422.

[lviii] Csaba NIKOLENYI, “Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe”, Party Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2004, p. 146; Arthur LUPIA and Kaare STROM, “Coalition Termination…cit.”; Bernard GROFMAN, “The Comparative Analysis…cit.”.